Was Wegner rejecting mental causality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20401166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tomáš Marvan (0000-0002-8487-5394, Czech Academy of Sciences, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 646-653 |
| Publication date | 2021-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory & Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/09593543211000820 |
| OpenAlex | W3145764524 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states, such as intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not a completely reliable indicator of the causality of action and needs to be replaced by more objective means of inquiry
Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Attribution · Causality (physics) · Causation · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Sense of agency · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|