Harry Cleeveley
Biographic Data
| ID | 1311845 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Harry Cleeveley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Harry |
| FAMILY NAME | Cleeveley |
| SIGNATURE | CLEEVELEY H |
| AFFILIATIONS | London , UK |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3008-8328 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The deep incoherence of strong necessities
Modal rationalism is the claim that for all p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. This will be true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities, where a strong necessity (for short) is a proposition that is conceivably false, but which is true in all metaphysically possible worlds. But are there any strong necessities? Various alleged examples have been proposed and …
Consciousness and the structure of the world
The Plurality of the Self
The Plurality of the Self 3 out a philosophical space in which it is literally true both that I would go with my transplanted brain, and that I existed as a pre-conscious foetus.If I am successful, this will allow Lockeans to accept that we are literally and strictly speaking animals, and it will remove a potential objection to Lockeanism, namely that it does not allow us to make such a claim.But how is this possible?The answer cannot be that I a…
The a Priori Truth of Modal Rationalism
Modal rationalism is the claim that for any proposition p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. If true, modal rationalism must itself be an a priori truth. Moreover, modal rationalism is true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities. But are there any strong necessities? In this paper, I set out a transcendental argument to show that there cannot be any, because th…
The a Priori Truth of Modal Rationalism
Modal rationalism is the claim that for any proposition p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. If true, modal rationalism must itself be an a priori truth. Moreover, modal rationalism is true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities. But are there any strong necessities? In this paper, I set out a transcendental argument to show that there cannot be any, because th…
The a Priori Truth of Modal Rationalism
Modal rationalism is the claim that for any proposition p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. If true, modal rationalism must itself be an a priori truth. Moreover, modal rationalism is true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities. But are there any strong necessities? In this paper, I set out a transcendental argument to show that there cannot be any, because th…
The Plurality of the Self
The Plurality of the Self 3 out a philosophical space in which it is literally true both that I would go with my transplanted brain, and that I existed as a pre-conscious foetus.If I am successful, this will allow Lockeans to accept that we are literally and strictly speaking animals, and it will remove a potential objection to Lockeanism, namely that it does not allow us to make such a claim.But how is this possible?The answer cannot be that I a…
Consciousness and the structure of the world
The deep incoherence of strong necessities
Modal rationalism is the claim that for all p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. This will be true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities, where a strong necessity (for short) is a proposition that is conceivably false, but which is true in all metaphysically possible worlds. But are there any strong necessities? Various alleged examples have been proposed and …
Epistemology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · A priori and a posteriori (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Proposition (2 works) · Rationalism (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (1 works)