The a Priori Truth of Modal Rationalism

Bibliographic Data

ID4351975
AuthorsHarry Cleeveley (0000-0002-3008-8328, London , UK, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume72
Issue4
Pages816-836
Publication date2022-09-08
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqab061
OpenAlexW4210963481
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

Modal rationalism is the claim that for any proposition p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. If true, modal rationalism must itself be an a priori truth. Moreover, modal rationalism is true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities. But are there any strong necessities? In this paper, I set out a transcendental argument to show that there cannot be any, because they are not genuinely conceivable. I argue that if it were ideally conceivable that there are strong necessities, then it would be impossible for us to have any modal knowledge of the world. Given that we do have some modal knowledge of the world, it follows that strong necessities are not ideally conceivable and therefore that modal rationalism itself is an a priori truth

A priori and a posteriori · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Modal · Modal logic · Proposition · Rationalism · Transcendental number · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access