Lukas Schwengerer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1313013 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lukas Schwengerer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lukas |
| FAMILY NAME | Schwengerer |
| SIGNATURE | SCHWENGERER L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Duisburg-Essen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2653-0988 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Critical Social Epistemology of Social Media and Epistemic Virtues
This paper suggests that virtue epistemology can help decide how to respond to conflicts between different epistemic goals for social media. It is a contribution to critical epistemology of social media insofar as it supplements system-level consideration with insights from individualist epistemology. In particular, whereas the proposal of critical social epistemology of social media by Joshua Habgood-Coote suggests that conflicts between epistem…
Self-Knowledge of Belief Requires Understanding of Propositions
I show that from common views about propositions as sets of possible worlds and knowledge requiring a sufficiently strong safety condition one can derive a condition stating that self-knowledge of belief is only possible if the content of that belief is fully understood. I show this by a reductio. If a subject S lacks full understanding of a proposition p, then S’s belief about believing that p cannot amount to knowledge. Even though my argument …
Overconfidence and Prosocial Behavior-Promoting Virtual Reality
Eliana Mary Horn (2026) proposes an account of how we ought to understand prosocial behavior-promoting virtual reality that forms a middle ground between an overly optimistic and overly pessimistic perspective. Horn argues that the right sort of engagement with virtual reality cannot provide us with knowledge of what it is like to be a marginalized person, but it can provide us with a form of grounded inferential knowledge related to the marginal…
Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts
This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework.I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge.Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations.I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint accep…
How can members of large, complex groups know the group’s attitudes
Members of large, complex groups – organizations – often need to know what the group wants. They usually need to know what the group’s goals are to figure out how to best aid the group. But how exactly do these group members gain that knowledge? In this paper I suggest that one main route to member knowledge of group goals and attitudes is inferential and analyze that route. Some of the inferential mechanisms are based on human’s mindreading abil…
Towards tool-assisted self-knowledge
Cassam ( Self-Knowledge for humans . Oxford University Press, 2014) introduced the term substantial self-knowledge to capture self-knowledge that is difficult to attain and plays a central role in one’s life and self-conception. Knowing whether one wants another child, whether one is a kind person, or whether one values honesty are unlike many trivial cases of knowing one’s occurrent mental state, such as knowing that one is in pain or believes i…
We‐Mode as Layered Agency
We humans are social beings.1 As such, our agency can take on goals and means that are not only determined by an agent individually but by cooperating and coordinating with other people. Agents that are part of groups can act with the group in mind. They can act as group members taking on the group's motivational structure. I can act as a member of the philosophy department aiming for what the department agreed on, even if that might conflict wit…
On the Intellectual Vice of Epistemic Apathy
Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. Following the motivational viewpoint on vice, we conclude that epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations. The apathetic agent possesses bad (or, at least, …
An anchored joint acceptance account of group justification
When does a group justifiedly believe that p ? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunatel…
Virtual reality as a path to self-knowledge
I discuss how virtual reality can be used to acquire self-knowledge. Lawlor (Philos Phenomenol Res 79(1):47–75, 2009) and Cassam (Vices of the mind: from the intellectual to the political. OUP, Oxford, 2014) develop inferential accounts of self-knowledge in which one can use imagination to acquire self-knowledge. This is done by actively prompting imaginary scenarios and observing one’s reactions to those scenarios. These reactions are then used …
Collective vice and collective self-knowledge
Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an ac…
Towards Collective Self-knowledge
We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPho…
Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind
The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our backgro…
Collective vice and collective self-knowledge
Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an ac…
Virtual reality as a path to self-knowledge
I discuss how virtual reality can be used to acquire self-knowledge. Lawlor (Philos Phenomenol Res 79(1):47–75, 2009) and Cassam (Vices of the mind: from the intellectual to the political. OUP, Oxford, 2014) develop inferential accounts of self-knowledge in which one can use imagination to acquire self-knowledge. This is done by actively prompting imaginary scenarios and observing one’s reactions to those scenarios. These reactions are then used …
Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind
The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our backgro…
Towards Collective Self-knowledge
We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPho…
An anchored joint acceptance account of group justification
When does a group justifiedly believe that p ? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunatel…
Virtual reality as a path to self-knowledge
I discuss how virtual reality can be used to acquire self-knowledge. Lawlor (Philos Phenomenol Res 79(1):47–75, 2009) and Cassam (Vices of the mind: from the intellectual to the political. OUP, Oxford, 2014) develop inferential accounts of self-knowledge in which one can use imagination to acquire self-knowledge. This is done by actively prompting imaginary scenarios and observing one’s reactions to those scenarios. These reactions are then used …
Collective vice and collective self-knowledge
Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an ac…
We‐Mode as Layered Agency
We humans are social beings.1 As such, our agency can take on goals and means that are not only determined by an agent individually but by cooperating and coordinating with other people. Agents that are part of groups can act with the group in mind. They can act as group members taking on the group's motivational structure. I can act as a member of the philosophy department aiming for what the department agreed on, even if that might conflict wit…
On the Intellectual Vice of Epistemic Apathy
Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. Following the motivational viewpoint on vice, we conclude that epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations. The apathetic agent possesses bad (or, at least, …
Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts
This paper closes a gap in joint acceptance accounts of the mental life of groups by presenting a theory of group self-knowledge in the joint acceptance framework.I start out by presenting desiderata for a theory of group self-knowledge.Any such theory has to explain the linguistic practice of group avowals, and how self-knowledge can play a role in practical and moral considerations.I develop an account of group self-knowledge in the joint accep…
How can members of large, complex groups know the group’s attitudes
Members of large, complex groups – organizations – often need to know what the group wants. They usually need to know what the group’s goals are to figure out how to best aid the group. But how exactly do these group members gain that knowledge? In this paper I suggest that one main route to member knowledge of group goals and attitudes is inferential and analyze that route. Some of the inferential mechanisms are based on human’s mindreading abil…
Towards tool-assisted self-knowledge
Cassam ( Self-Knowledge for humans . Oxford University Press, 2014) introduced the term substantial self-knowledge to capture self-knowledge that is difficult to attain and plays a central role in one’s life and self-conception. Knowing whether one wants another child, whether one is a kind person, or whether one values honesty are unlike many trivial cases of knowing one’s occurrent mental state, such as knowing that one is in pain or believes i…
Critical Social Epistemology of Social Media and Epistemic Virtues
This paper suggests that virtue epistemology can help decide how to respond to conflicts between different epistemic goals for social media. It is a contribution to critical epistemology of social media insofar as it supplements system-level consideration with insights from individualist epistemology. In particular, whereas the proposal of critical social epistemology of social media by Joshua Habgood-Coote suggests that conflicts between epistem…
Self-Knowledge of Belief Requires Understanding of Propositions
I show that from common views about propositions as sets of possible worlds and knowledge requiring a sufficiently strong safety condition one can derive a condition stating that self-knowledge of belief is only possible if the content of that belief is fully understood. I show this by a reductio. If a subject S lacks full understanding of a proposition p, then S’s belief about believing that p cannot amount to knowledge. Even though my argument …
Overconfidence and Prosocial Behavior-Promoting Virtual Reality
Eliana Mary Horn (2026) proposes an account of how we ought to understand prosocial behavior-promoting virtual reality that forms a middle ground between an overly optimistic and overly pessimistic perspective. Horn argues that the right sort of engagement with virtual reality cannot provide us with knowledge of what it is like to be a marginalized person, but it can provide us with a form of grounded inferential knowledge related to the marginal…
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works)