An anchored joint acceptance account of group justification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20141892 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lukas Schwengerer (0000-0002-2653-0988, University of Duisburg‐Essen, Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften, Institut für Philosophie Universitätsstr. 12 Essen 45141 Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 432-450 |
| Publication date | 2023-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12460 |
| OpenAlex | W4362640081 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 19 |
When does a group justifiedly believe that p ? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunately, Jennifer Lackey developed a powerful argument against joint acceptance accounts. She argues that these accounts lead to epistemically arbitrary reasons and therefore justification at will. Group justification loses the necessary connection to the world to be truth‐conducive. In this paper I develop a new form of a joint acceptance account that can deal with Lackey's examples: the anchored joint acceptance account of group justification. I argue that properly understanding the role of epistemic expectations can help us form the best version of a joint acceptance account. While justification is only generated by joint acceptance of evidence, the evidential expectations towards a group are anchored in the group members. This anchoring guarantees that groups cannot manipulate their ultima facie justification illegitimately
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Explanatory power · Group (periodic table) · Joint (building) · Law and economics · Power (physics) · Prima facie · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Social Ontology
Social Knowing
Group virtue epistemology
Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action
What Is Justified Group Belief
Justification and the Social Nature of Knowledge
Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source
Ought We to Follow Our Evidence
We Will Do It
Walking Together
The Metaphysics of Social Groups
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |