What Is Justified Group Belief
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695780 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jennifer Lackey (0000-0001-7754-248X, Northwestern University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 125 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 341-396 |
| Publication date | 2016-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-3516946 |
| OpenAlex | W2508529758 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 38 |
| References cited | 55 |
This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—inflationary views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and deflationary views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an altogether different place for an adequate account of justified group belief. From these objections emerges the skeleton of the positive view that this essay goes on to develop and defend, called the group epistemic agent account: groups are epistemic agents in their own right, with justified beliefs that respond to both evidence and normative requirements that arise only at the group level but that are nonetheless importantly constrained by the epistemic status of the beliefs of their individual members
Epistemology · Group (periodic table) · Normative · Nothing · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Divergence Arguments in Collective Epistemology
Group Action Without Group Minds
Group Knowledge, Questions, and the Division of Epistemic Labour
Implications for the Testimonial Reductionism/Anti-Reductionism Debate from Psychological Studies of Selective Trust
Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash
Epistemic Collaborations
Warranted Group Belief
Towards Collective Self-knowledge
Group Inquiry
Permissive Divergence
Coherence in Science
On group background beliefs
Group motivation
Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons
Summativism and non-summativism about groups
Shaping Shared Values
Epistemologia Coletiva
AI and the expert; a blueprint for the ethical use of opaque AI
An anchored joint acceptance account of group justification
The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge
Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms
Weakness of Political Will
Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality
Can groups be genuine believers? The argument from interpretationism
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation
Group disagreement
Pragmatic encroachment and justified group belief
Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge
Collective intellectual humility and arrogance
The environmental image
The relation between group epistemic structure and operative members in epistemic group
Reliable group belief
Two approaches to naturalistic social ontology
Group understanding
Collective vice and collective self-knowledge
Do Collaborators in Science Need to Agree
How can we assess whether to trust collectives of scientists
Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics
The structure of empirical knowledge
Learning from Words
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality
Knowledge and Lotteries
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Warrant and Proper Function
Putting Logic in its Place
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Against Gullibility
Aggregating Sets of Judgments
What is Justified Belief?
Knowledge and Action
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
The paradox of the preface
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Group Agency
Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes
Social Knowing
Aggregating with reason(s)
Group beliefs
Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition
Aggregating Sets of Judgments
On the Seriousness of Mistakes
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Groundless Belief
Content Preservation
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge
Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense
Collective Epistemology
Contemporary theories of knowledge
Epistemology and cognition
Judgment Aggregation
| Unique citing works | 38 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,22 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 36 |