John J Tilley
Biographic Data
| ID | 1313481 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John J Tilley |
| GIVEN NAMES | John J |
| FAMILY NAME | Tilley |
| SIGNATURE | TILLEY J J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6310-972X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Psychological Egoism and Ought-Implies-Can
A common assumption is that psychological egoism, the view that a person can do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest, combined with ought-implies-can, the view that a person morally ought to do an act only if she can do it, entails the view – call it OIB – that a person morally ought to do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest. I argue that psychological egoism and ought-implies-can, interpreted fairly…
On deducing ethical egoism from psychological egoism
A familiar question is whether psychological egoism (suitably supplemented with plausible further premises) entails ethical egoism. This paper considers this question, treating it much more thoroughly than do any previous treatments. For instance, it discusses all the most common understandings of ethical and psychological egoism. It further discusses many strategies and arguments relevant to the question addressed. Although this procedure create…
On an Alleged Refutation of Ethical Egoism
Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs
A familiar claim, meant as a challenge to moral knowledge, is that we can credibly accept putative moral facts just in case they explain natural facts. This article critically addresses Elizabeth Tropman's response to a version of that claim. Her response has interest partly because it falls within, and extends, an influential philosophical tradition – that of trying to expose (some) sceptical challenges as spurious or ill‐conceived. Also, Tropma…
Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke on Desire and Self-Interest
Among the most animating debates in eighteenth-century British ethics was the debate over psychological egoism, the view that our most basic desires are self-interested. An important episode in that debate, less well known than it should be, was the exchange between Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull. In the early editions of his Inquiry into Virtue, Hutcheson argued ingeniously against psychological egoism; in his Foundation of Morality, …
Cultural Relativism
This entry briefly discusses the development and content of the main positions commonly called cultural relativism – for example, moral cultural relativism, descriptive cultural relativism, and methodological forms of cultural relativism. The controversy over moral cultural relativism receives attention as well
Hutcheson's Theological Objection to Egoism
Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheso…
Dismissive Replies to “Why Should I Be Moral?”
The question "Why should I be moral?," taken as a request for reasons to be moral, strikes many philosophers as silly, confused, or otherwise out of line. Hence we find many attempts to dismiss it as spurious. This paper addresses four such attempts and shows that they fail. It does so partly by discussing various errors about reasons for action, errors that lie at the root of the view that "Why should I be moral?" is ill-conceived. Such errors i…
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “Why be moral?”
Meditation and Consolatory Soul God Dialogues in Seventeenth-Century Lutheran Germany
Journal Article Meditation and Consolatory Soul–God Dialogues in Seventeenth-Century Lutheran Germany Get access Janette Tilley Janette Tilley * *Lehman College, City University of New York. Email: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Music and Letters, Volume 88, Issue 3, August 2007, Pages 436–457, https://doi.org/10.1093/ml/gcm004 Published: 01 August 2007
Moral Arguments for Cultural Relativism
In this article I discuss the ethical theory of cultural relativism. In particular, I refute six arguments for that theory, each of which is ‘moral’ in this sense: it aims to associate a vice (or a negative trait) with nonrelativism or a virtue (or a positive trait) with relativism. Along the way I discuss some empirical research which may seem, but in fact fails, to establish a link between moral relativism and tolerance
Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof
The moral theory of cultural relativism asserts, roughly, that although for every culture some moral judgments are valid, no moral judgment is universally valid, meaning valid for all cultures. Given the political significance of this theory, it’s worth our while to examine not only the theory itself, but the assumptions that account for its popularity. One such assumption is that in debates between cultural relativists and universalists, the bur…
Motivation and Practical Reasons
Two kinds of moral relativism
Accounting for the ‘tragedy’ in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Moral Arguments for Cultural Relativism
In this article I discuss the ethical theory of cultural relativism. In particular, I refute six arguments for that theory, each of which is ‘moral’ in this sense: it aims to associate a vice (or a negative trait) with nonrelativism or a virtue (or a positive trait) with relativism. Along the way I discuss some empirical research which may seem, but in fact fails, to establish a link between moral relativism and tolerance
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “Why be moral?”
Accounting for the ‘tragedy’ in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Two kinds of moral relativism
Motivation and Practical Reasons
Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof
The moral theory of cultural relativism asserts, roughly, that although for every culture some moral judgments are valid, no moral judgment is universally valid, meaning valid for all cultures. Given the political significance of this theory, it’s worth our while to examine not only the theory itself, but the assumptions that account for its popularity. One such assumption is that in debates between cultural relativists and universalists, the bur…
Moral Arguments for Cultural Relativism
In this article I discuss the ethical theory of cultural relativism. In particular, I refute six arguments for that theory, each of which is ‘moral’ in this sense: it aims to associate a vice (or a negative trait) with nonrelativism or a virtue (or a positive trait) with relativism. Along the way I discuss some empirical research which may seem, but in fact fails, to establish a link between moral relativism and tolerance
Meditation and Consolatory Soul God Dialogues in Seventeenth-Century Lutheran Germany
Journal Article Meditation and Consolatory Soul–God Dialogues in Seventeenth-Century Lutheran Germany Get access Janette Tilley Janette Tilley * *Lehman College, City University of New York. Email: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Music and Letters, Volume 88, Issue 3, August 2007, Pages 436–457, https://doi.org/10.1093/ml/gcm004 Published: 01 August 2007
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “Why be moral?”
Dismissive Replies to “Why Should I Be Moral?”
The question "Why should I be moral?," taken as a request for reasons to be moral, strikes many philosophers as silly, confused, or otherwise out of line. Hence we find many attempts to dismiss it as spurious. This paper addresses four such attempts and shows that they fail. It does so partly by discussing various errors about reasons for action, errors that lie at the root of the view that "Why should I be moral?" is ill-conceived. Such errors i…
Hutcheson's Theological Objection to Egoism
Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheso…
Cultural Relativism
This entry briefly discusses the development and content of the main positions commonly called cultural relativism – for example, moral cultural relativism, descriptive cultural relativism, and methodological forms of cultural relativism. The controversy over moral cultural relativism receives attention as well
Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke on Desire and Self-Interest
Among the most animating debates in eighteenth-century British ethics was the debate over psychological egoism, the view that our most basic desires are self-interested. An important episode in that debate, less well known than it should be, was the exchange between Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull. In the early editions of his Inquiry into Virtue, Hutcheson argued ingeniously against psychological egoism; in his Foundation of Morality, …
Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs
A familiar claim, meant as a challenge to moral knowledge, is that we can credibly accept putative moral facts just in case they explain natural facts. This article critically addresses Elizabeth Tropman's response to a version of that claim. Her response has interest partly because it falls within, and extends, an influential philosophical tradition – that of trying to expose (some) sceptical challenges as spurious or ill‐conceived. Also, Tropma…
On an Alleged Refutation of Ethical Egoism
On deducing ethical egoism from psychological egoism
A familiar question is whether psychological egoism (suitably supplemented with plausible further premises) entails ethical egoism. This paper considers this question, treating it much more thoroughly than do any previous treatments. For instance, it discusses all the most common understandings of ethical and psychological egoism. It further discusses many strategies and arguments relevant to the question addressed. Although this procedure create…
Psychological Egoism and Ought-Implies-Can
A common assumption is that psychological egoism, the view that a person can do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest, combined with ought-implies-can, the view that a person morally ought to do an act only if she can do it, entails the view – call it OIB – that a person morally ought to do an act only if she believes that the act is in her interest. I argue that psychological egoism and ought-implies-can, interpreted fairly…
Philosophy (14 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Ethics in medical practice (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Ethical egoism (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Environmental ethics (4 works) · Law (4 works)