Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs
Inappropriate to Demand Them
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143070 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John J Tilley (0000-0002-6310-972X, Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 86 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 293-308 |
| Publication date | 2020-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12236 |
| OpenAlex | W3013383994 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
A familiar claim, meant as a challenge to moral knowledge, is that we can credibly accept putative moral facts just in case they explain natural facts. This article critically addresses Elizabeth Tropman's response to a version of that claim. Her response has interest partly because it falls within, and extends, an influential philosophical tradition – that of trying to expose (some) sceptical challenges as spurious or ill‐conceived. Also, Tropman's target is not just any version of the claim just mentioned. It is Gilbert Harman's classic version, according to which putative moral facts must earn credibility by explaining the formation of moral beliefs. This version has wide influence, and variations of it are possible in many areas. Tropman's response is thus well worth attention
Credibility · Epistemology · Moral authority · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Natural (archaeology) · Skepticism · Social cognitive theory of morality · Spurious relationship · Computer Science · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |