Benjamin Garcia Holgado
Biographic Data
| ID | 1322528 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benjamin Garcia Holgado |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benjamin Garcia |
| FAMILY NAME | Holgado |
| SIGNATURE | HOLGADO B G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6768-3366 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Overruling the Executive: Judicial Strategies to Resist Democratic Erosion
How can autonomous apex courts with specific attitudes and role conceptions counter executive aggrandizement? This article theorizes two causal mechanisms through which justices can resist democratic erosion. The first mechanism involves apex courts employing judicial review to neutralize autocratic legalism by blocking strategies such as institutional conversion, replacement, and layering that executives use to expand their power. The second inv…
The Dark Side of Legalism: Abuse of the Law and Democratic Erosion in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela
Why do some elected leaders use legalistic strategies to undermine democracy from within? And under what conditions do they succeed in the use of these strategies? In this article, we argue that the abuse of law is at the center of the toolkit of emerging autocrats. Executives use an ample menu of legal tools and mechanisms (laws, constitutional amendments, executive decrees, administrative resolutions, and regulations by federal agencies) to gra…
Court-packing and democratic decay: A necessary relationship
A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven…
Why Democracy Survives Presidential Encroachments: Argentina Since 1983
This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The em…
Why Democracy Survives Presidential Encroachments: Argentina Since 1983
This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The em…
Court-packing and democratic decay: A necessary relationship
A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven…
Overruling the Executive: Judicial Strategies to Resist Democratic Erosion
How can autonomous apex courts with specific attitudes and role conceptions counter executive aggrandizement? This article theorizes two causal mechanisms through which justices can resist democratic erosion. The first mechanism involves apex courts employing judicial review to neutralize autocratic legalism by blocking strategies such as institutional conversion, replacement, and layering that executives use to expand their power. The second inv…
The Dark Side of Legalism: Abuse of the Law and Democratic Erosion in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela
Why do some elected leaders use legalistic strategies to undermine democracy from within? And under what conditions do they succeed in the use of these strategies? In this article, we argue that the abuse of law is at the center of the toolkit of emerging autocrats. Executives use an ample menu of legal tools and mechanisms (laws, constitutional amendments, executive decrees, administrative resolutions, and regulations by federal agencies) to gra…
Court-packing and democratic decay: A necessary relationship
A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven…
Why Democracy Survives Presidential Encroachments: Argentina Since 1983
This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The em…
The Dark Side of Legalism: Abuse of the Law and Democratic Erosion in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela
Why do some elected leaders use legalistic strategies to undermine democracy from within? And under what conditions do they succeed in the use of these strategies? In this article, we argue that the abuse of law is at the center of the toolkit of emerging autocrats. Executives use an ample menu of legal tools and mechanisms (laws, constitutional amendments, executive decrees, administrative resolutions, and regulations by federal agencies) to gra…
Overruling the Executive: Judicial Strategies to Resist Democratic Erosion
How can autonomous apex courts with specific attitudes and role conceptions counter executive aggrandizement? This article theorizes two causal mechanisms through which justices can resist democratic erosion. The first mechanism involves apex courts employing judicial review to neutralize autocratic legalism by blocking strategies such as institutional conversion, replacement, and layering that executives use to expand their power. The second inv…
Democracy (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Executive branch (2 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (2 works) · Political economy (2 works)