Razvan Vlaicu
Biographic Data
| ID | 1323929 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Razvan Vlaicu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Razvan |
| FAMILY NAME | Vlaicu |
| SIGNATURE | VLAICU R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, College Park |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 36 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Voting age, information experiments, and political engagement
Employee trust and performance constraints in public sector organizations
Self-Enforcing Partisan Procedures
Using a multistage model of collective decision making, we study how partisan polarization in legislatures affects the initial choice and future revision of procedural rules. We analyze how a legislature allocates proposal power over policy decisions under uncertainty about the future polarization in policy preferences among legislators. Our notion of polarization encompasses both intra- and interparty heterogeneity in policy preferences. We show…
Mejor gasto para mejores vidas
El gasto público ha aumentado en América Latina y el Caribe. Aprovechando las bajas tasas de interés y las ganancias extraordinarias de los productos básicos, muchos gobiernos de la región intentaron abrirse camino hacia el futuro. Lamentablemente, la fiesta se acabó y los responsables de las políticas públicas deberán encontrar la manera de mantener sus economías en crecimiento y a sus ciudadanos felices de manera sostenible desde el punto de vi…
Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations
A puzzling feature of self‐governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly nonmajoritarian, procedures (e.g., chairs and committees). This article provides a theory of self‐enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (1) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (2) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (3) with what policy consequences. I…
Do housing bubbles generate fiscal bubbles
Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures
We present a theory of parties-in-legislatures that can generate partisan policy outcomes despite the absence of any party-imposed voting discipline. Legislators choose all procedures and policies through majority-rule bargaining and cannot commit to vote against their preferences on either. Yet, off-median policy bias occurs in equilibrium because a majority of legislators with correlated preferences has policy-driven incentives to adopt partisa…
Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism
Despite having adopted the political institutions of established democracies, democratizing countries display a systematically different pattern of fiscal outcomes. This article attributes these differences to the low credibility of electoral promises in new democracies. We study a model of electoral competition where candidates have two costly means to make themselves credible: spending resources to communicate directly with voters and exploitin…
Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures
We present a theory of parties-in-legislatures that can generate partisan policy outcomes despite the absence of any party-imposed voting discipline. Legislators choose all procedures and policies through majority-rule bargaining and cannot commit to vote against their preferences on either. Yet, off-median policy bias occurs in equilibrium because a majority of legislators with correlated preferences has policy-driven incentives to adopt partisa…
Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations
A puzzling feature of self‐governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly nonmajoritarian, procedures (e.g., chairs and committees). This article provides a theory of self‐enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (1) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (2) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (3) with what policy consequences. I…
Do housing bubbles generate fiscal bubbles
Self-Enforcing Partisan Procedures
Using a multistage model of collective decision making, we study how partisan polarization in legislatures affects the initial choice and future revision of procedural rules. We analyze how a legislature allocates proposal power over policy decisions under uncertainty about the future polarization in policy preferences among legislators. Our notion of polarization encompasses both intra- and interparty heterogeneity in policy preferences. We show…
Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism
Despite having adopted the political institutions of established democracies, democratizing countries display a systematically different pattern of fiscal outcomes. This article attributes these differences to the low credibility of electoral promises in new democracies. We study a model of electoral competition where candidates have two costly means to make themselves credible: spending resources to communicate directly with voters and exploitin…
Do housing bubbles generate fiscal bubbles
Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures
We present a theory of parties-in-legislatures that can generate partisan policy outcomes despite the absence of any party-imposed voting discipline. Legislators choose all procedures and policies through majority-rule bargaining and cannot commit to vote against their preferences on either. Yet, off-median policy bias occurs in equilibrium because a majority of legislators with correlated preferences has policy-driven incentives to adopt partisa…
Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations
A puzzling feature of self‐governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly nonmajoritarian, procedures (e.g., chairs and committees). This article provides a theory of self‐enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (1) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (2) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (3) with what policy consequences. I…
Mejor gasto para mejores vidas
El gasto público ha aumentado en América Latina y el Caribe. Aprovechando las bajas tasas de interés y las ganancias extraordinarias de los productos básicos, muchos gobiernos de la región intentaron abrirse camino hacia el futuro. Lamentablemente, la fiesta se acabó y los responsables de las políticas públicas deberán encontrar la manera de mantener sus economías en crecimiento y a sus ciudadanos felices de manera sostenible desde el punto de vi…
Self-Enforcing Partisan Procedures
Using a multistage model of collective decision making, we study how partisan polarization in legislatures affects the initial choice and future revision of procedural rules. We analyze how a legislature allocates proposal power over policy decisions under uncertainty about the future polarization in policy preferences among legislators. Our notion of polarization encompasses both intra- and interparty heterogeneity in policy preferences. We show…
Employee trust and performance constraints in public sector organizations
Voting age, information experiments, and political engagement
Economics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works)