Thomas M Besch
Biographic Data
| ID | 1401709 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas M Besch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas M |
| FAMILY NAME | Besch |
| SIGNATURE | BESCH T M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Wuhan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9121-3244 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Is Power Noumenal in Nature
This paper engages Rainer Forst's doctrine of noumenal power. At the centre of this doctrine is its signature claim that power is noumenal in nature. I reconstruct Forst's definition of power and distinguish three conceptions of noumenal power in his writings. I argue that, on each conception, we should reject that claim. It emerges that the professed noumenality of power is either a trivial feature of power, or else a feature only of some forms …
Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons
According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, that is, reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of reasonableness that undermines both (i) an…
Why Inconclusiveness is a Problem for Public Reason
On Robust Discursive Equality
This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purch…
Critical reflection on toleration in social work
The concept of toleration does not play a prominent role in current social work discourse. However, it is important for social workers to understand what toleration is and to critically reflect on its potential for positive or negative effects in social work. Toleration in social work is inseparable from power relations and its effects are context-dependent. While some forms of toleration are expressions of respect and recognition, power asymmetr…
Public Justification, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality
The paper challenges the view that public justification sits well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I engage political liberalism's view of public justification. A standard objection to this view is that public justification should be more inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egalitarian terms. If inclusive public justification allocates discursive standing that has much discursive purchase, a…
Schmidtz on Moral Recognition Rules
David Schmidtz's reconstruction of morality advances Hart‐type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart‐type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his r…
On toleration in social work
Toleration is one of many responses towards diversity and difference. With the growing diversity, the theme of toleration has often taken centre stage in discussions of multiculturalism and social pluralism. Nonetheless, it has not received much attention in the social work profession. Social workers often encounter situations in which they face a choice between tolerating and not tolerating. We argue that toleration is a legitimate and relevant …
On the Right to Justification and Discursive Respect
Rainer Forst's constructivism argues that a right to justification provides a reasonably non-rejectable foundation of justice. With an exemplary focus on his attempt to ground human rights, I argue that this right cannot provide such a foundation. To accord to others such a right is to include them in the scope of discursive respect. But it is reasonably contested whether we should accord to others equal discursive respect. It follows that Forst'…
On Discursive Respect
Moral and political forms of constructivism accord to people strong, “constitutive” forms of discursive standing and so build on, or express, a commitment to discursive respect. The paper explores dimensions of discursive respect, i.e., depth, scope, and purchase; it addresses tenuous interdependencies between them; on this basis, it identifies limitations of the idea of discursive respect and of constructivism. The task of locating discursive re…
Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity
The paper argues that applications of the principle that "ought" implies "can" (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between "ought" and "can" is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, "factualist" conception of OIC and endorse weak "normativism." Even if we use OIC as the rule "''therefore'ought not'," applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on "proto-ideals" of…
Constructing Practical Reason
On the Right to Justification and Discursive Respect
Rainer Forst's constructivism argues that a right to justification provides a reasonably non-rejectable foundation of justice. With an exemplary focus on his attempt to ground human rights, I argue that this right cannot provide such a foundation. To accord to others such a right is to include them in the scope of discursive respect. But it is reasonably contested whether we should accord to others equal discursive respect. It follows that Forst'…
Critical reflection on toleration in social work
The concept of toleration does not play a prominent role in current social work discourse. However, it is important for social workers to understand what toleration is and to critically reflect on its potential for positive or negative effects in social work. Toleration in social work is inseparable from power relations and its effects are context-dependent. While some forms of toleration are expressions of respect and recognition, power asymmetr…
Public Justification, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality
The paper challenges the view that public justification sits well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I engage political liberalism's view of public justification. A standard objection to this view is that public justification should be more inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egalitarian terms. If inclusive public justification allocates discursive standing that has much discursive purchase, a…
On toleration in social work
Toleration is one of many responses towards diversity and difference. With the growing diversity, the theme of toleration has often taken centre stage in discussions of multiculturalism and social pluralism. Nonetheless, it has not received much attention in the social work profession. Social workers often encounter situations in which they face a choice between tolerating and not tolerating. We argue that toleration is a legitimate and relevant …
Constructing Practical Reason
Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity
The paper argues that applications of the principle that "ought" implies "can" (OIC) depend on normative considerations even if the link between "ought" and "can" is logical in nature. Thus, we should reject a common, "factualist" conception of OIC and endorse weak "normativism." Even if we use OIC as the rule "''therefore'ought not'," applying OIC is not a mere matter of facts and logic, as factualists claim, but often draws on "proto-ideals" of…
On Discursive Respect
Moral and political forms of constructivism accord to people strong, “constitutive” forms of discursive standing and so build on, or express, a commitment to discursive respect. The paper explores dimensions of discursive respect, i.e., depth, scope, and purchase; it addresses tenuous interdependencies between them; on this basis, it identifies limitations of the idea of discursive respect and of constructivism. The task of locating discursive re…
On the Right to Justification and Discursive Respect
Rainer Forst's constructivism argues that a right to justification provides a reasonably non-rejectable foundation of justice. With an exemplary focus on his attempt to ground human rights, I argue that this right cannot provide such a foundation. To accord to others such a right is to include them in the scope of discursive respect. But it is reasonably contested whether we should accord to others equal discursive respect. It follows that Forst'…
Schmidtz on Moral Recognition Rules
David Schmidtz's reconstruction of morality advances Hart‐type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart‐type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his r…
On toleration in social work
Toleration is one of many responses towards diversity and difference. With the growing diversity, the theme of toleration has often taken centre stage in discussions of multiculturalism and social pluralism. Nonetheless, it has not received much attention in the social work profession. Social workers often encounter situations in which they face a choice between tolerating and not tolerating. We argue that toleration is a legitimate and relevant …
Critical reflection on toleration in social work
The concept of toleration does not play a prominent role in current social work discourse. However, it is important for social workers to understand what toleration is and to critically reflect on its potential for positive or negative effects in social work. Toleration in social work is inseparable from power relations and its effects are context-dependent. While some forms of toleration are expressions of respect and recognition, power asymmetr…
Public Justification, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality
The paper challenges the view that public justification sits well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I engage political liberalism's view of public justification. A standard objection to this view is that public justification should be more inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egalitarian terms. If inclusive public justification allocates discursive standing that has much discursive purchase, a…
Why Inconclusiveness is a Problem for Public Reason
On Robust Discursive Equality
This paper explores the idea of robust discursive equality on which respect-based conceptions of justificatory reciprocity often draw. I distinguish between formal and substantive discursive equality and argue that if justificatory reciprocity requires that people be accorded formally equal discursive standing, robust discursive equality should not be construed as requiring standing that is equal substantively, or in terms of its discursive purch…
Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons
According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, that is, reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of reasonableness that undermines both (i) an…
Is Power Noumenal in Nature
This paper engages Rainer Forst's doctrine of noumenal power. At the centre of this doctrine is its signature claim that power is noumenal in nature. I reconstruct Forst's definition of power and distinguish three conceptions of noumenal power in his writings. I argue that, on each conception, we should reject that claim. It emerges that the professed noumenality of power is either a trivial feature of power, or else a feature only of some forms …
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Economics (3 works)