Anita M Superson
Biographic Data
| ID | 1402165 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anita M Superson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anita M |
| FAMILY NAME | Superson |
| SIGNATURE | SUPERSON A M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Kentucky |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
On Being a Fan and on Fanhood and Its Implications for Defeating the Moral Sceptic
I employ the notion of fanhood to object to David Gauthier's Dependency Thesis, according to which, if a disposition is rationally required to adopt, so too are the acts expressing it. I first establish that fanhood is a commitment relevantly similar to a moral commitment. I then argue that, because genuine fanhood characteristically issues in inherently irrational behaviours in the form of ‘luck charms,’ or, superstitious practices fans believe …
Out from the ShadowsAnalytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy
This collection draws together 18 papers on topics in standard areas of traditional analytical philosophy, written from a feminist perspective. It brings out traditional philosophy by challenging it in a constructive, socially critical way that is essential for philosophy's fundamental goal of pursuing truth that matters
Strategies for Making Feminist Philosophy Mainstream Philosophy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Deferential Wife Revisited
This paper rejects two main arguments for absolving the deferential wife and victims of deprived circumstances from responsibility or blame for their servility: for Susan Wolf, circumstances can determine their reasons and acts, and for Sarah Buss, circumstances can give them excusing reasons for their acts. The paper argues that circumstances can give them justifying reasons to act in ways defending their intrinsic worth when their acts can be l…
The Moral Skeptic
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, …
Feminist Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
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Feminist Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests
The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to a…
The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions
I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a m…
Privilege, Immorality, and Responsibility for Attending to the “Facts about Humanity”
Moral Understandings
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Moral luck and partialist theories
Scepticism about Moral Motives
Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number-Kant and Aris…
From Morality to Virtue
Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian Revival
In Realizing Rawls , Thomas Pogge defends a Rawlsian conception of justice. The book is divided into three main parts; this discussion will concentrate on the first two. Part 1 constitutes a defence of some aspects of Rawls's theory against objections raised by Nozick and Michael Sandel. This is followed by a second part on the two principles of justice—what they amount to, and some applications of them. Part 3 argues that the Rawlsian scheme sho…
Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests
The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to a…
The Moral Skeptic
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, …
Strategies for Making Feminist Philosophy Mainstream Philosophy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions
I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a m…
Moral luck and partialist theories
Scepticism about Moral Motives
Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number-Kant and Aris…
Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian Revival
In Realizing Rawls , Thomas Pogge defends a Rawlsian conception of justice. The book is divided into three main parts; this discussion will concentrate on the first two. Part 1 constitutes a defence of some aspects of Rawls's theory against objections raised by Nozick and Michael Sandel. This is followed by a second part on the two principles of justice—what they amount to, and some applications of them. Part 3 argues that the Rawlsian scheme sho…
From Morality to Virtue
Moral luck and partialist theories
Scepticism about Moral Motives
Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number-Kant and Aris…
Moral Understandings
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Privilege, Immorality, and Responsibility for Attending to the “Facts about Humanity”
Feminist Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Feminist Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests
The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to a…
The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions
I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a m…
The Moral Skeptic
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, …
The Deferential Wife Revisited
This paper rejects two main arguments for absolving the deferential wife and victims of deprived circumstances from responsibility or blame for their servility: for Susan Wolf, circumstances can determine their reasons and acts, and for Sarah Buss, circumstances can give them excusing reasons for their acts. The paper argues that circumstances can give them justifying reasons to act in ways defending their intrinsic worth when their acts can be l…
Strategies for Making Feminist Philosophy Mainstream Philosophy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Out from the ShadowsAnalytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy
This collection draws together 18 papers on topics in standard areas of traditional analytical philosophy, written from a feminist perspective. It brings out traditional philosophy by challenging it in a constructive, socially critical way that is essential for philosophy's fundamental goal of pursuing truth that matters
On Being a Fan and on Fanhood and Its Implications for Defeating the Moral Sceptic
I employ the notion of fanhood to object to David Gauthier's Dependency Thesis, according to which, if a disposition is rationally required to adopt, so too are the acts expressing it. I first establish that fanhood is a commitment relevantly similar to a moral commitment. I then argue that, because genuine fanhood characteristically issues in inherently irrational behaviours in the form of ‘luck charms,’ or, superstitious practices fans believe …
Sociology (14 works) · Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (4 works)