Scepticism about Moral Motives

Bibliographic Data

ID3890558
AuthorsAnita M Superson (University of Kentucky, corresponding author)
Year1996
Volume35
Issue1
Pages15-34
Publication date1996-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217300008040
OpenAlexW1991309825
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number-Kant and Aristotle come to mind-are concerned in part with the kind of motive agents ought to have and from which they ought to act. But the link to scepticism has not been clearly made. At issue is whether scepticism is fully defeated if we show that every morally required act is rationally required, even if we leave it possible that a fully rational person who performs the act just "goes through the motions" in doing so

Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Morality · Rationality · Skepticism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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