Dan Enoch
Biographic Data
| ID | 140636 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dan Enoch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dan |
| FAMILY NAME | Enoch |
| SIGNATURE | ENOCH D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9529-9110 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 27 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 151 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 27 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Politics and suffering
Political philosophy should focus not on uplifting ideals, but rather, so I argue, on minimizing serious suffering. This is so not because other things do not ultimately matter (they do), but rather because in the political context, the stakes in terms of suffering are usually extremely high, so that any other considerations are almost always outweighed. Put in moderately deontological terms: the high stakes carry most political decisions across …
Enforcing Morality
In Enforcing Morality, Steven Wall revisits fundamental and important normative questions about the relations between law and morality, about the proper limits of law, and in particular about whether it’s a legitimate aim for a state to try and make its subjects more virtuous and their lives go better, or whether the mere immorality of an action suffices as a reason for criminalization, or perhaps for some lesser kind of legal intervention and re…
New perspectives on Judith Shklar
How Nudging Upsets Autonomy
Everyone suspects that nudging offends against the nudged’s autonomy. But it has proved rather difficult to say why. In this paper I offer a new diagnosis of the tension between even the best cases of nudging and the value of autonomy. Relying on the distinction between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as non-alienation, I show that nudging need not offend against either. But it does sever the tie between them, it undermines the possibility o…
Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed!
Suppose someone is brought up as an orthodox Jew, and so only eats kosher, is very conservative sexually, etc. Suppose they then find out that this Judaism stuff is just all a big mistake. If they then regret all the shrimp they could have eaten, all the sex!, this makes perfect sense. Not so, however, if someone finds out that moral realism is false, and they now regret all the fun they could have had hurting people’s feeling, etc. Even if this …
The Case for Voting to Change the Outcomes Is Weaker Than It May Seem
Because you are highly unlikely to cast the deciding vote in the next elections, it is often said that you don’t have a reason to vote in order to change the outcomes. In a recent paper, however, Zach Barnett forcefully argues that this is a mistake. He shows how it follows, from rather conservative assumptions, that in many real-life cases the expected social value of voting is higher than its cost. Barnett is successful, we believe, in showing …
Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid
Autonomy as Non‐alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics
Statistical resentment, or
False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I
The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rational…
Thanks, We’re good
Against Public Reason
A Defense of Moral Deference
The Disorder of Public Reason
Authority and Reason‐Giving 1
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
PROBLEMA bus causes harm.In the first scenario, an eyewitness recognizes the bus as belonging to the Blue Bus Company.The witness, however, is imperfectly reliable; let us say that she is roughly 70 percent reliable in matters such as this one.The law has no qualms about accepting the eyewitness testimony as evidence and indeed basing a positive finding that the bus was a Blue Bus bus (and perhaps also that the Blue Bus Company is liable) on the …
Taking Morality Seriously
David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends robust realism - a strongly realist view of ethics and normativity, according to which there are perfectly universal and objective moral truths. He offers positive arguments for the view, and asserts that no other metaethical position can vindicate our taking morality seriously.
Shmagency Revisited
In metaethics — and indeed, meta-normativity — constitutivism is a family of views that hope to ground normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and agency. And, mostly because of the influential work of Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman (and, some would say, because of the also influential work of Kant and Aristotle), constitutivism seems to be gaining ground in the current literature.
On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism
In Slaves of the Passions Mark Schroeder puts forward Hypotheticalism, his version of a Humean theory of normative reasons that is capable, so he argues, of avoiding many of the difficulties Humeanism is traditionally vulnerable to. This critical notice first outlines the main argument of the book and then proceeds to highlight some difficulties and challenges. It argues that these challenges show that Schroeder's improvements on traditional Hume…
The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism
Moral Luck and the Law
Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be …
Wouldn't It Be Nice If p , Therefore, p (for a moral p)
Instances of the argument-schema ‘Wouldn't it be nice if p , therefore, p ’ are usually fallacious, but for a moral p they are not clearly as bad as they are elsewhere. I offer a diagnosis of this phenomenon, arguing that in some conditions – specified in terms of a logical property of the relevant normative operator – such arguments are actually valid (for a moral p
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason
More and more people seem to think that constructivism – in political philosophy, in moral philosophy, and perhaps in practical reasoning most generally – is the way to go. And yet it is surprisingly hard to even characterize the view. In this paper, I go to some lengths trying to capture the essence of a constructivist position – mostly in the realm of practical reason – and to pinpoint its theoretical attractions. I then give some reason to sus…
How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified
In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief‐forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief‐forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account ba…
Agency, Shmagency
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
PROBLEMA bus causes harm.In the first scenario, an eyewitness recognizes the bus as belonging to the Blue Bus Company.The witness, however, is imperfectly reliable; let us say that she is roughly 70 percent reliable in matters such as this one.The law has no qualms about accepting the eyewitness testimony as evidence and indeed basing a positive finding that the bus was a Blue Bus bus (and perhaps also that the Blue Bus Company is liable) on the …
Authority and Reason‐Giving 1
Agency, Shmagency
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason
More and more people seem to think that constructivism – in political philosophy, in moral philosophy, and perhaps in practical reasoning most generally – is the way to go. And yet it is surprisingly hard to even characterize the view. In this paper, I go to some lengths trying to capture the essence of a constructivist position – mostly in the realm of practical reason – and to pinpoint its theoretical attractions. I then give some reason to sus…
How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified
In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief‐forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief‐forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account ba…
Why Idealize
Autonomy as Non‐alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics
False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I
The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rational…
Wouldn't It Be Nice If p , Therefore, p (for a moral p)
Instances of the argument-schema ‘Wouldn't it be nice if p , therefore, p ’ are usually fallacious, but for a moral p they are not clearly as bad as they are elsewhere. I offer a diagnosis of this phenomenon, arguing that in some conditions – specified in terms of a logical property of the relevant normative operator – such arguments are actually valid (for a moral p
Marital Relations and Combat Stress Reaction
Zahava Solomon, Mark Waysman, Ruth Belkin, Gaby Levy, Mario Mikulincer, Dan Enoch, Marital Relations and Combat Stress Reaction: The Wives' Perspective, Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 54, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 316-326
Statistical resentment, or
Thanks, We’re good
Moral Luck and the Law
Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be …
Marital Relations and Combat Stress Reaction
Zahava Solomon, Mark Waysman, Ruth Belkin, Gaby Levy, Mario Mikulincer, Dan Enoch, Marital Relations and Combat Stress Reaction: The Wives' Perspective, Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 54, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 316-326
Why Idealize
Agency, Shmagency
How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified
In this paper, we present an account of in virtue of what thinkers are justified in employing certain basic belief‐forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach’s work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing a belief‐forming method that is indispensable for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account ba…
Wouldn't It Be Nice If p , Therefore, p (for a moral p)
Instances of the argument-schema ‘Wouldn't it be nice if p , therefore, p ’ are usually fallacious, but for a moral p they are not clearly as bad as they are elsewhere. I offer a diagnosis of this phenomenon, arguing that in some conditions – specified in terms of a logical property of the relevant normative operator – such arguments are actually valid (for a moral p
Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason
More and more people seem to think that constructivism – in political philosophy, in moral philosophy, and perhaps in practical reasoning most generally – is the way to go. And yet it is surprisingly hard to even characterize the view. In this paper, I go to some lengths trying to capture the essence of a constructivist position – mostly in the realm of practical reason – and to pinpoint its theoretical attractions. I then give some reason to sus…
The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism
Moral Luck and the Law
Is there a difference in moral blameworthiness between a murderer and an attempted murderer? Should there be a legal difference between them? These questions are particular instances of the question of moral luck and legal luck (respectively). In this paper, I survey and explain the main argumentative moves within the general philosophical discussion of moral luck. I then discuss legal luck, and the different ways in which this discussion may be …
Taking Morality Seriously
David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends robust realism - a strongly realist view of ethics and normativity, according to which there are perfectly universal and objective moral truths. He offers positive arguments for the view, and asserts that no other metaethical position can vindicate our taking morality seriously.
Shmagency Revisited
In metaethics — and indeed, meta-normativity — constitutivism is a family of views that hope to ground normativity in norms, or standards, or motives, or aims that are constitutive of action and agency. And, mostly because of the influential work of Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman (and, some would say, because of the also influential work of Kant and Aristotle), constitutivism seems to be gaining ground in the current literature.
On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism
In Slaves of the Passions Mark Schroeder puts forward Hypotheticalism, his version of a Humean theory of normative reasons that is capable, so he argues, of avoiding many of the difficulties Humeanism is traditionally vulnerable to. This critical notice first outlines the main argument of the book and then proceeds to highlight some difficulties and challenges. It argues that these challenges show that Schroeder's improvements on traditional Hume…
Authority and Reason‐Giving 1
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
PROBLEMA bus causes harm.In the first scenario, an eyewitness recognizes the bus as belonging to the Blue Bus Company.The witness, however, is imperfectly reliable; let us say that she is roughly 70 percent reliable in matters such as this one.The law has no qualms about accepting the eyewitness testimony as evidence and indeed basing a positive finding that the bus was a Blue Bus bus (and perhaps also that the Blue Bus Company is liable) on the …
The Disorder of Public Reason
A Defense of Moral Deference
Against Public Reason
False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I
The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rational…
Thanks, We’re good
Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid
Autonomy as Non‐alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics
Statistical resentment, or
Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed!
Suppose someone is brought up as an orthodox Jew, and so only eats kosher, is very conservative sexually, etc. Suppose they then find out that this Judaism stuff is just all a big mistake. If they then regret all the shrimp they could have eaten, all the sex!, this makes perfect sense. Not so, however, if someone finds out that moral realism is false, and they now regret all the fun they could have had hurting people’s feeling, etc. Even if this …
The Case for Voting to Change the Outcomes Is Weaker Than It May Seem
Because you are highly unlikely to cast the deciding vote in the next elections, it is often said that you don’t have a reason to vote in order to change the outcomes. In a recent paper, however, Zach Barnett forcefully argues that this is a mistake. He shows how it follows, from rather conservative assumptions, that in many real-life cases the expected social value of voting is higher than its cost. Barnett is successful, we believe, in showing …
How Nudging Upsets Autonomy
Everyone suspects that nudging offends against the nudged’s autonomy. But it has proved rather difficult to say why. In this paper I offer a new diagnosis of the tension between even the best cases of nudging and the value of autonomy. Relying on the distinction between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as non-alienation, I show that nudging need not offend against either. But it does sever the tie between them, it undermines the possibility o…
Politics and suffering
Political philosophy should focus not on uplifting ideals, but rather, so I argue, on minimizing serious suffering. This is so not because other things do not ultimately matter (they do), but rather because in the political context, the stakes in terms of suffering are usually extremely high, so that any other considerations are almost always outweighed. Put in moderately deontological terms: the high stakes carry most political decisions across …
Epistemology (22 works) · Philosophy (21 works) · Political science (15 works) · Law (12 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (12 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Sociology (12 works) · Free Will and Agency (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (9 works)