Wouldn't It Be Nice If p , Therefore, p (for a moral p)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8087803 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dan Enoch (0000-0001-9529-9110, corresponding author), David Enoch (0000-0002-5433-0801) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 222-224 |
| Publication date | 2009-04-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820809003495 |
| OpenAlex | W3125684080 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 3 |
Instances of the argument-schema ‘Wouldn't it be nice if p , therefore, p ’ are usually fallacious, but for a moral p they are not clearly as bad as they are elsewhere. I offer a diagnosis of this phenomenon, arguing that in some conditions – specified in terms of a logical property of the relevant normative operator – such arguments are actually valid (for a moral p
Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Nice · Normative · Phenomenon · Property (philosophy · Schema (genetic algorithms · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Philosophy
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| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,69 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2025 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |