The Reason-Giving Force of Requests

Bibliographic Data

ID21701749
AuthorsPeter Schaber (0000-0002-9613-629X, University of Zurich, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume24
Issue2
Pages431-442
Publication date2021-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-021-10174-8
OpenAlexW3137285009
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited6

How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch

Epistemology · Law and economics · Normative · Normative social influence · Philosophy of medicine · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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