John K Stranlund
Biographic Data
| ID | 1414044 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John K Stranlund |
| GIVEN NAMES | John K |
| FAMILY NAME | Stranlund |
| SIGNATURE | STRANLUND J K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Massachusetts Amherst |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 72 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Social context, framing, and compliance with the law: Experimental Evidence
Imperfect enforcement of emissions trading and industry welfare: A laboratory investigation
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of riskneutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforceme…
Institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games: A Bayesian examination
A main research focus in many Social Dilemma Games is the suitability of external institutional treatments in inducing socially optimal outcomes. It is likely that participating subjects exhibit unobserved heterogeneity in their reaction to these treatments. This type of “institutional heterogeneity” has to date not found much attention in the experimental literature. We propose a Hierarchical Bayesian estimation framework to highlight these hete…
Does government regulation complement existing community efforts to support cooperation? Evidence from field experiments in Colombia
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Colombia.The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages.In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good.In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for…
Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality
Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance
Combining an analysis of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emissions trading program, a comprehensive review of the enforcement strategies employed in Sulfur Dioxide Allowance and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) programs, and a review of the compliance performance of these programs thus far, we are able to propose several practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs. We stress the importance of pre…
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
Bargaining to preserve a unique ecosystem: The role of anticipatory investments to establish stronger bargaining positions
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance
Combining an analysis of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emissions trading program, a comprehensive review of the enforcement strategies employed in Sulfur Dioxide Allowance and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) programs, and a review of the compliance performance of these programs thus far, we are able to propose several practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs. We stress the importance of pre…
Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
Bargaining to preserve a unique ecosystem: The role of anticipatory investments to establish stronger bargaining positions
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality
Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs: Theory, Practice, and Performance
Combining an analysis of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emissions trading program, a comprehensive review of the enforcement strategies employed in Sulfur Dioxide Allowance and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) programs, and a review of the compliance performance of these programs thus far, we are able to propose several practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs. We stress the importance of pre…
Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia
Imperfect enforcement of emissions trading and industry welfare: A laboratory investigation
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of riskneutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforceme…
Institutional heterogeneity in social dilemma games: A Bayesian examination
A main research focus in many Social Dilemma Games is the suitability of external institutional treatments in inducing socially optimal outcomes. It is likely that participating subjects exhibit unobserved heterogeneity in their reaction to these treatments. This type of “institutional heterogeneity” has to date not found much attention in the experimental literature. We propose a Hierarchical Bayesian estimation framework to highlight these hete…
Does government regulation complement existing community efforts to support cooperation? Evidence from field experiments in Colombia
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Colombia.The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages.In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good.In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for…
Social context, framing, and compliance with the law: Experimental Evidence
Economics (7 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (5 works) · Public economics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Enforcement (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works)