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Enforcing Emissions Trading Programs

Theory, Practice, and Performance

Bibliographic Data

ID6328110
AuthorsJohn K Stranlund (University of Massachusetts Amherst), Cuauhtémoc Chávez (0000-0002-6045-2282, University of Massachusetts Amherst), Carlos A Chavez, Barry C Field (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
Year2002
Volume30
Issue3
Pages343-361
Publication date2002-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolicy Studies Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1541-0072.2002.tb02151.x
OpenAlexW1867527578
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited19

Combining an analysis of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emissions trading program, a comprehensive review of the enforcement strategies employed in Sulfur Dioxide Allowance and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) programs, and a review of the compliance performance of these programs thus far, we are able to propose several practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs. We stress the importance of prevailing market prices for emissions permits in determining compliance incentives, the importance of accurately measuring firms' emissions, and the importance of implementing enforcement strategies that remove the incentives firms may have to falsify emissions reports

Air pollution · Allowance (engineering · Business · Clean Air Act · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Emissions trading · Enforcement · Environmental economics · Greenhouse gas · Incentive · Incentive program · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Natural resource economics · Operations management · Public economics · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies

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Unique citing works8
Citations per year0,33
Citation span2002 - 2023 (22)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 8

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