Andries Nentjes
Biographic Data
| ID | 1414628 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andries Nentjes |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andries |
| FAMILY NAME | Nentjes |
| SIGNATURE | NENTJES A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, University of Groningen, Westerhaven 16A, Postbus 716, 9700 AS Groningen, The Netherlands |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Testing the theory of emissions trading
The Public Firm and Strategic Interaction
Usually public monopoly firms have the task of providing services while covering costs with the revenue from charges paid by users. From the literature it is known that if users take the charge as given, the zero-profit constraint of the public firm results in an inefficient allocation of resources. In this paper, it is shown that the inefficiency will be completely corrected if the not-for-profit supplier faces a surplus-maximising single purcha…
Kyoto Mechanisms
Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets
In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-…
Tradable Carbon Permits in Europe
In the European Union (EU) the discussions on climate policy have focused on the instrument of taxation. However, there has been considerable opposition from both Member States and industry against the combined carbodenergy tax proposals. In this article, an alternative market‐oriented instrument for controlling CO 2 emissions is discussed which overcomes some of the disadvantages of the tax: tradable emission permits. Special regard is given to …
Organizational slack in subsidized nonprofit institutions
Organizational slack in subsidized nonprofit institutions
Kyoto Mechanisms
Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets
In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-…
Organizational slack in subsidized nonprofit institutions
Tradable Carbon Permits in Europe
In the European Union (EU) the discussions on climate policy have focused on the instrument of taxation. However, there has been considerable opposition from both Member States and industry against the combined carbodenergy tax proposals. In this article, an alternative market‐oriented instrument for controlling CO 2 emissions is discussed which overcomes some of the disadvantages of the tax: tradable emission permits. Special regard is given to …
Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets
In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-…
Kyoto Mechanisms
The Public Firm and Strategic Interaction
Usually public monopoly firms have the task of providing services while covering costs with the revenue from charges paid by users. From the literature it is known that if users take the charge as given, the zero-profit constraint of the public firm results in an inefficient allocation of resources. In this paper, it is shown that the inefficiency will be completely corrected if the not-for-profit supplier faces a surplus-maximising single purcha…
Testing the theory of emissions trading
Business (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (3 works) · Emissions trading (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Greenhouse gas (2 works)