Roman M Sheremeta
Biographic Data
| ID | 1417201 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roman M Sheremeta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roman M |
| FAMILY NAME | Sheremeta |
| SIGNATURE | SHEREMETA R M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Chapman University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8386-8494 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 52 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine
In times of war, evacuating civilians from conflict zones is of critical importance to their survival and well-being. However, many people are hesitant to evacuate. While text-based nudges have been studied in other contexts, their effectiveness in encouraging evacuation during armed conflict remains under-explored. We conducted a controlled survey experiment in Ukraine in July 2022—during the ongoing full-scale Russian invasion—by varying the fr…
Competition between and within universities: Theoretical and experimental investigation of group identity and the desire to win
The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
Economics and psychology of contests
Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find significant overexpenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and…
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more re…
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of cont…
Conflicted emotions following trust-based interaction
Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments beca…
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
Fight or Flight: Defending against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle, while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to…
A generalized Tullock contest
Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries, and in the second stage, the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first-stage expenditures and the tota…
Fight or Flight: Defending against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle, while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to…
Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find significant overexpenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and…
A generalized Tullock contest
Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries, and in the second stage, the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first-stage expenditures and the tota…
Conflicted emotions following trust-based interaction
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments beca…
The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more re…
Economics and psychology of contests
Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries, and in the second stage, the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical predictions: the first-stage expenditures and the tota…
A generalized Tullock contest
Fight or Flight: Defending against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle, while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to…
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments beca…
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of cont…
Conflicted emotions following trust-based interaction
Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find significant overexpenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and…
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more re…
Economics and psychology of contests
The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
Competition between and within universities: Theoretical and experimental investigation of group identity and the desire to win
Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine
In times of war, evacuating civilians from conflict zones is of critical importance to their survival and well-being. However, many people are hesitant to evacuate. While text-based nudges have been studied in other contexts, their effectiveness in encouraging evacuation during armed conflict remains under-explored. We conducted a controlled survey experiment in Ukraine in July 2022—during the ongoing full-scale Russian invasion—by varying the fr…
Economics (11 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (11 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Law (8 works) · CONTEST (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (4 works)