The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling
Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283391 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Charles A Holt (0000-0002-7282-0185, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA), Andrew H Kydd (0000-0002-9837-4793, University of Wisconsin–Madison), Andrew Kydd (University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA), Laura Razzolini (0000-0002-2934-1752, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA), Roman M Sheremeta (0000-0001-8386-8494, Case Western Reserve University), Roman Sheremeta (0000-0001-6558-7912, Case Western Reserve University and the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 482-500 |
| Publication date | 2016-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002714545223 |
| OpenAlex | W2015259954 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 20 |
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory
Computer security · Econometrics · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Profiling (computer programming · Racial profiling · Sociology · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
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| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,36 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2024 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |