Roman Sheremeta
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382552 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roman Sheremeta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roman |
| FAMILY NAME | Sheremeta |
| SIGNATURE | SHEREMETA R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Case Western Reserve University and the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6558-7912 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Competition between and within universities: Theoretical and experimental investigation of group identity and the desire to win
Economics and psychology of contests
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more re…
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more re…
Economics and psychology of contests
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more re…
Economics and psychology of contests
Competition between and within universities: Theoretical and experimental investigation of group identity and the desire to win
Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Competition (biology (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Game theory (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works)