John G Riley
Biographic Data
| ID | 1454351 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John G Riley |
| GIVEN NAMES | John G |
| FAMILY NAME | Riley |
| SIGNATURE | RILEY J G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Los Angeles |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9140-7521 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1955 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Silver Signals
The theory of market signaling and screening is a cornerstone of the new economics of information. The last two and a half decades have not only witnessed a series of remarkable theoretical developments but also a wide range of applications. This essay examines the key theoretical issues and explores their use in three major fields: industrial organization, labor, and finance. Considerable emphasis is placed on attempts to test the theory in each…
Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers
A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants in contests to exercise political i…
Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions
The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs…
Competition with Hidden Knowledge
Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis
Human capital theorists have traditionally argued that individuals invest in education until the marginal gain in productivity is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. However, the observed correlations among income, education, and ability measures are also consistent with education being used to screen for exogenous ability differences. This paper tests for such an informational role, arguing that screening will be much more important in some …
Optimal residential density and road transportation
"Comment on Strodtbeck's Review of "Scale Analysis
Optimal residential density and road transportation
Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis
Human capital theorists have traditionally argued that individuals invest in education until the marginal gain in productivity is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. However, the observed correlations among income, education, and ability measures are also consistent with education being used to screen for exogenous ability differences. This paper tests for such an informational role, arguing that screening will be much more important in some …
Competition with Hidden Knowledge
Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions
The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs…
"Comment on Strodtbeck's Review of "Scale Analysis
Optimal residential density and road transportation
Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis
Human capital theorists have traditionally argued that individuals invest in education until the marginal gain in productivity is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. However, the observed correlations among income, education, and ability measures are also consistent with education being used to screen for exogenous ability differences. This paper tests for such an informational role, arguing that screening will be much more important in some …
Competition with Hidden Knowledge
Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers
A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants in contests to exercise political i…
Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions
The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs…
Silver Signals
The theory of market signaling and screening is a cornerstone of the new economics of information. The last two and a half decades have not only witnessed a series of remarkable theoretical developments but also a wide range of applications. This essay examines the key theoretical issues and explores their use in three major fields: industrial organization, labor, and finance. Considerable emphasis is placed on attempts to test the theory in each…
Economics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Geography (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work)