Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4030157 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John G Riley (0000-0002-9140-7521, Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California., corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 41-50 |
| Publication date | 1989-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.3.3.41 |
| OpenAlex | W2051270003 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 4 |
The first objective of this paper has been to explain why it is that expected seller revenue is the same under very different auction rules. The second objective has been to explain why revenue equivalence no longer holds once the central assumptions of risk aversion and independence of beliefs are modified. The effect of risk aversion is to make a sealed high bid auction more attractive from a seller's viewpoint. The effect of correlated beliefs is to favor open bidding. Which of the two factors dominates under plausible assumptions about risk aversion parameters and about the degree to which beliefs are correlated remains an important open question
Auction theory · Bidding · Common value auction · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Revenue · Revenue equivalence · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance
| Citations per year | 0.12 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1993 - 2015 (23) |
| Highly cited | No |