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Takuo Sugaya

Biographic Data

ID1454935
NAMETakuo Sugaya
GIVEN NAMESTakuo
FAMILY NAMESugaya
SIGNATURESUGAYA T
AFFILIATIONSStanford University
ORCID0000-0001-5104-5469
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS6
AUTHOR COUNT4
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2018
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX2
  • Mediated Collusion

    Juan Ortner, Takuo Sugaya et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2023•References: 1

  • The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome

    Open Access•Steven Callander, Dana Foarta et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2023•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Policy outcomes are determined not by the words in a statute but by the actions of private citizens. A policy's success or failure depends on how it shapes behavior and how that behavior shapes the future course of policy. To understand this process, we develop a model that combines the political and nonpolitical domains, focusing on competition policy and the regulation of markets. We show how the outcome of a policy change develops over time as…

  • Communication and Community Enforcement

    Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2021•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a "bad type" who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners' identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the…

  • Maintaining Privacy in Cartels

    Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018

    It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels—monitoring of competitors' prices, sales, and profits—facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead worked to preserve the privacy of their participants' actions and outcomes. Toward explaining this behavior, we show that cartels can sometimes sustain higher profits when actions and outcomes are observed only privately, because better information can hinder coll…

  • The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome

    Open Access•Steven Callander, Dana Foarta et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2023•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Policy outcomes are determined not by the words in a statute but by the actions of private citizens. A policy's success or failure depends on how it shapes behavior and how that behavior shapes the future course of policy. To understand this process, we develop a model that combines the political and nonpolitical domains, focusing on competition policy and the regulation of markets. We show how the outcome of a policy change develops over time as…

  • Communication and Community Enforcement

    Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2021•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a "bad type" who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners' identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the…

  • Maintaining Privacy in Cartels

    Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018

    It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels—monitoring of competitors' prices, sales, and profits—facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead worked to preserve the privacy of their participants' actions and outcomes. Toward explaining this behavior, we show that cartels can sometimes sustain higher profits when actions and outcomes are observed only privately, because better information can hinder coll…

  • Communication and Community Enforcement

    Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2021•Cited by: 2•References: 6

    We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a "bad type" who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners' identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the…

  • Mediated Collusion

    Juan Ortner, Takuo Sugaya et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2023•References: 1

  • The Dynamics of a Policy Outcome

    Open Access•Steven Callander, Dana Foarta et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2023•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Policy outcomes are determined not by the words in a statute but by the actions of private citizens. A policy's success or failure depends on how it shapes behavior and how that behavior shapes the future course of policy. To understand this process, we develop a model that combines the political and nonpolitical domains, focusing on competition policy and the regulation of markets. We show how the outcome of a policy change develops over time as…

Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Collusion (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Enforcement (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works)

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