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Communication and Community Enforcement

Bibliographic Data

ID10176757
AuthorsTakuo Sugaya (0000-0001-5104-5469), Alexander Wolitzky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Year2021
Volume129
Issue9
Pages2595-2628
Publication date2021-04-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/715023
OpenAlexW3157470586
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited41

We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a "bad type" who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners' identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the absence of explicit communication but that introducing within-match cheap talk communication restores cooperation. Thus, communication is essential for community enforcement

Business · Computer security · Dilemma · Economics · Enforcement · Game theory · Internet privacy · Matching (statistics · Microeconomics · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics

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Unique citing works4
Citations per year1
Citation span2022 - 2026 (5)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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