Social Norms and Community Enforcement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23329006 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michihiro Kandori (Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 63 |
| Publication date | 1992-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Economic Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6527 • E-ISSN: 1467-937X |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2297925 |
| OpenAlex | W2056700716 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 193 |
| References cited | 4 |
The present paper extends the theory of self-enforcing agreements in a long-term relationship (the Folk Theorem in repeated games) to the situation where agents change their partners over time. Cooperation is sustained because defection against one agent causes sanction by others, and the paper shows how such a “social norm” is sustained by self-interested agents under various degrees of observability. Two main results are presented. The first one is an example where a community can sustain cooperation even when each agent knows nothing more than his personal experience. The second shows a Folk Theorem that the community can realize any mutually beneficial outcomes when each agent carries a label such as reputation, membership, or licence, which are revised in a systematic way.
Business · Economics · Enforcement · Epistemology · Folk theorem · Game theory · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Norm (philosophy) · Nothing · Observability · Political science · Repeated game · Reputation · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics
Inclusive and Exclusive Social Capital in the Small-Firm Sector in Developing Countries
On Repeated Games with Endogenous Matching Decision
Institutions and Impersonal Exchange
Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis
The Role of Social Capital in Development
Why do people cooperate
The Formation of Cooperative Relationships
Redes sociales, capital social y acción colectiva en dos territorios campesinos de la región de La Araucanía, en Chile, para enfrentar problemas asociados al acceso al agua
Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice
Corruption and Reputation
International Labour Standards and Product Differentiation
Reputación grupal endógena. Un modelo formal
Friend or Foe? Cooperation and Learning in High-Stakes Games
Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement
Social Approval, Values, and AFDC
Credit, Incentives, and Reputation
Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844
Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital
The Maghribi traders
Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy
Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance
Learning to trust strangers
Norm enforcement on minorities
Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents
The Political Economy of the American Frontier
Partisan Models and the Search for Party Effects in the US Senate
Interest Group Theory
The Party Faithful
How Parties Nominate Presidents
The Comparative Advantage of State Interest Organization Research
Theories of Parties
The Road Less Taken
Party Coalitions in the US Congress
Social and Economic Justice Movements and Organizations
Who Sings in the Heavenly Chorus?
Party Nominating Procedures and Recruitment—State and Local Level
Activists, Influence, and Representation in American Elections
Methodological Issues in the Study of Political Parties
Political Parties and Consultants
State Parties Research
The Mobilization and Influence of Business Interests
What a Difference Twenty-Five Years Makes
Interest Groups and Agendas
Interest Groups in American Elections
The State of Research on Political Parties and Interest Groups
The Evolution of National Party Organizations
Lobbying and Influence
Urban Interest Groups
The Evolution and Alteration of American Party Coalitions
The Pure Partisan Institution
Linking Political Parties and Interest Groups
The President, Party Politics, and Constitutional Development
Winning Isn't Everything
Methodological Perspectives on Interest Groups
American Political Parties
Development And The Interaction Of Enforcement Institutions
Evolution of the Social Contract
A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
Trust and Social Collateral
Modeling civil violence
Persistent parochialism
Formal versus Informal Finance
The impact of social norms on entrepreneurial action
Social Capital and Social Quilts
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam
The Role of Social Work Norms in Job Searching and Subjective Well-Being
Do Television and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indonesian Villages
Where Is the Economics in Spatial Econometrics?
Gender, Culture, and Corruption
Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?
The Evolution of Social Norms
Social Capital
Comparing theories of institutional change
Institutions
Third-party punishment and social norms
The promise of Mechanical Turk
The Structural Weight of Social Identity
The Oxford handbook of American political parties and interest groups
Social Networks and the Process of Globalization
Informal Incentives and Labour Markets
Costly information intermediation
Inequality, social norms and cooperation
Networks of Relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication
Social Comparisons in Games
Just saying sorry—The effect of apologies on reintegration after social exclusion
Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing
The Effects of Social Trust and Institutional Trust on Formal Volunteering and Charitable Giving in Japan
Plausible cooperation
Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement
A model of network redistributive pressure
Managing trust under dynamic information
Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions
Extortion and Cooperation in Rating Protocol Design for Competitive Crowdsourcing
The Trust Game
Financial inclusion of individuals who arrived as refugees to the United States
Wage returns to workplace training in Myanmar
Community enforcement and the cost of cooperation
Social interactions and contract enforcement in the postcolonial Arab world. Evidence from the industrial elite of Morocco, 1956–1982
| Unique citing works | 193 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 6,03 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 171 |