The Formation of Cooperative Relationships
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5769849 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rachel Kranton (University of Maryland, College Park, corresponding author), R E Kranton |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 214-233 |
| Publication date | 1996-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Law Economics and Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1465-7341 • E-ISSN: 8756-6222 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023358 |
| OpenAlex | W2035234632 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 9 |
This article investigates how individuals forge and maintain cooperative relationships when there is always the possibility of starting again with a new partner. The analysis shows that an ever-present opportunity to form new relationships need not destroy cooperation. Simple strategies achieve the (constrained) optimal level of cooperation. These strategies involve a "bond" in the form of reduced utility at the beginning of a relationship Two newly matched agents may have an incentive to forgo paying this bond, given that everyone else in the population requires payment of a bond to start a new relationship. This incentive disappears, however, if there is enough initial uncertainty about a new partner's valuation of future utility. Accounts from the sociological and anthropological literature indicate that individuals may indeed pay bonds to form cooperative relationships
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| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,38 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |