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Bruno Strulovici

Biographic Data

ID1454940
NAMEBruno Strulovici
GIVEN NAMESBruno
FAMILY NAMEStrulovici
SIGNATURESTRULOVICI B
AFFILIATIONSNorthwestern University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS15
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2013
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
H-INDEX2
  • Collective Commitment

    Christian Roessler, Sandro Shelegia et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•References: 3

    We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inefficient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? We provide a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage. When the condition holds, commitment has no value: any agreement that may be reached at the o…

  • The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives

    Open Access•Carlo Prato, Bruno Strulovici•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2017•Cited by: 12•References: 37

    Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct dem…

  • Discounting, Values, and Decisions

    John K-H Quah, John Quah et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2013•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    How do discount rates affect agents' decisions and valuations? This paper provides a general method to analyze this question, allowing stochastic and managed cash flows, stochastic discount rates, and time inconsistency and including arbitrary learning and payoff or utility processes. We show that some of these features can lead to counterintuitive answers (e.g., "a more patient agent stops earlier"), but we also establish, under simple condition…

  • The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives

    Open Access•Carlo Prato, Bruno Strulovici•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2017•Cited by: 12•References: 37

    Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct dem…

  • Discounting, Values, and Decisions

    John K-H Quah, John Quah et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2013•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    How do discount rates affect agents' decisions and valuations? This paper provides a general method to analyze this question, allowing stochastic and managed cash flows, stochastic discount rates, and time inconsistency and including arbitrary learning and payoff or utility processes. We show that some of these features can lead to counterintuitive answers (e.g., "a more patient agent stops earlier"), but we also establish, under simple condition…

  • Discounting, Values, and Decisions

    John K-H Quah, John Quah et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2013•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    How do discount rates affect agents' decisions and valuations? This paper provides a general method to analyze this question, allowing stochastic and managed cash flows, stochastic discount rates, and time inconsistency and including arbitrary learning and payoff or utility processes. We show that some of these features can lead to counterintuitive answers (e.g., "a more patient agent stops earlier"), but we also establish, under simple condition…

  • Collective Commitment

    Christian Roessler, Sandro Shelegia et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•References: 3

    We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inefficient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? We provide a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage. When the condition holds, commitment has no value: any agreement that may be reached at the o…

  • The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives

    Open Access•Carlo Prato, Bruno Strulovici•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2017•Cited by: 12•References: 37

    Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct dem…

Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Ballot (1 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae