The hidden cost of direct democracy

How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives

Bibliographic Data

ID6299092
AuthorsCarlo Prato (0000-0002-3643-9707, Georgetown University, corresponding author), Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)
Year2017
Volume29
Issue3
Pages440-466
Publication date2017-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629816650762
OpenAlexW3124966877
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited38

Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct democracy induces a negative spiral on politicians’ role and contribution to society, which may dominate any direct benefit. The theory offers predictions on reelection probabilities and politicians’ performance consistent with recent evidence from the US states

Ballot · Democracy · Direct democracy · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Representative democracy · Treaty · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration

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