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Omer Tamuz

Biographic Data

ID1454972
NAMEOmer Tamuz
GIVEN NAMESOmer
FAMILY NAMETamuz
SIGNATURETAMUZ O
AFFILIATIONSCalifornia Institute of Technology
ORCID0000-0002-0111-0418
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS3
WORKS AS AUTHOR6
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1
  • Private Private Information

    Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2025

  • Information Cascades and Social Learning

    Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Literature•2024

    Social learning is the updating of beliefs based on observation of others. Such observation can lead to efficient aggregation of information, but also to inaccurate decisions, fragility of mass behaviors, and, in the case of information cascades, to complete blockage of learning. We review the theory of information cascades and social learning and discuss important themes, insights, and applications of this literature as it has developed over the…

  • Information Cascades and Social Learning

    Open Access•Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2021

  • Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

    Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2021•References: 1

    We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. Our main result is that, for the two agent case, a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. For any number of agents, a related "no trade" condition likewise provides a characterization of feasibi…

  • Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise

    Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 3

    Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of fir…

  • Truthful Fair Division

    Open Access•Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz•CHAPTER•Algorithmic Game Theory•2010

  • Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise

    Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 3

    Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of fir…

  • Truthful Fair Division

    Open Access•Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz•CHAPTER•Algorithmic Game Theory•2010

  • Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise

    Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2019•Cited by: 3

    Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of fir…

  • Information Cascades and Social Learning

    Open Access•Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer et al.•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2021

  • Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

    Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2021•References: 1

    We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. Our main result is that, for the two agent case, a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. For any number of agents, a related "no trade" condition likewise provides a characterization of feasibi…

  • Information Cascades and Social Learning

    Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Literature•2024

    Social learning is the updating of beliefs based on observation of others. Such observation can lead to efficient aggregation of information, but also to inaccurate decisions, fragility of mass behaviors, and, in the case of information cascades, to complete blockage of learning. We review the theory of information cascades and social learning and discuss important themes, insights, and applications of this literature as it has developed over the…

  • Private Private Information

    Kevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2025

Computer Science (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae