Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs

Bibliographic Data

ID10174100
AuthorsItai Arieli (0000-0001-8663-5776), Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy (0000-0001-9886-3688), Omer Tamuz (0000-0002-0111-0418)
Year2021
Volume129
Issue9
Pages2546-2594
Publication date2021-04-21
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/714993
OpenAlexW3121368779
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited29

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. Our main result is that, for the two agent case, a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. For any number of agents, a related "no trade" condition likewise provides a characterization of feasibility. We use our characterization to construct joint belief distributions in which agents are informed regarding the state, and yet receive no information regarding the other's posterior. We study a related class of Bayesian persuasion problems with a single sender and multiple receivers, and explore the extreme points of the set of feasible distributions

Bayesian probability · Characterization (materials science · Class (philosophy · Communication source · Econometrics · Joint (building · Joint probability distribution · Mathematical economics · Persuasion · Posterior probability · Prior probability · Set (abstract data type · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access