William P Rogerson
Biographic Data
| ID | 1455099 |
|---|---|
| NAME | William P Rogerson |
| GIVEN NAMES | William P |
| FAMILY NAME | Rogerson |
| SIGNATURE | ROGERSON W P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Investment Decisions
This paper considers the profit-maximization problem of a firm that must make sunk investments in long-lived assets to produce output. It is shown that if per-period accounting income is calculated using a simple and natural allocation rule for investment, called the relative replacement cost (RRC) rule, under a broad range of plausible circumstances, the firm can choose the fully optimal sequence of investments over time simply by choosing a lev…
Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives
This paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures. The main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level. The income measure created by this allocation rule is usually refe…
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation . Jean-Jacques Laffont , Jean Tirole
Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process
This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive …
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
This paper argues that regulatory institutions in defense procurement are (and necessarily must be) organized to create prizes for innovation in the form of positive economic profit on production contracts. This has a number of important policy implications. The values of the prizes on twelve major aerospace projects are estimated using stock-market data and are shown to be large. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Investment and Entry When Price Guarantees Quality
Two previous models of the dissipation of profits generated by the use of quality-guaranteeing prices assumed that pro fits were dissipated through investment in brand-name capital and ent ry. The model of this paper allows both possibilities. It is shown th at both types of dissipation will, in general, occur and that brand-n ame investment will dissipate a greater share of profits as the elast icity of consumer response to brand-name investment…
Agriculture in development
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
This paper argues that regulatory institutions in defense procurement are (and necessarily must be) organized to create prizes for innovation in the form of positive economic profit on production contracts. This has a number of important policy implications. The values of the prizes on twelve major aerospace projects are estimated using stock-market data and are shown to be large. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
Agriculture in development
Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process
This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive …
Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives
This paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures. The main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level. The income measure created by this allocation rule is usually refe…
Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Investment Decisions
This paper considers the profit-maximization problem of a firm that must make sunk investments in long-lived assets to produce output. It is shown that if per-period accounting income is calculated using a simple and natural allocation rule for investment, called the relative replacement cost (RRC) rule, under a broad range of plausible circumstances, the firm can choose the fully optimal sequence of investments over time simply by choosing a lev…
The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Investment and Entry When Price Guarantees Quality
Two previous models of the dissipation of profits generated by the use of quality-guaranteeing prices assumed that pro fits were dissipated through investment in brand-name capital and ent ry. The model of this paper allows both possibilities. It is shown th at both types of dissipation will, in general, occur and that brand-n ame investment will dissipate a greater share of profits as the elast icity of consumer response to brand-name investment…
Agriculture in development
The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Investment and Entry When Price Guarantees Quality
Two previous models of the dissipation of profits generated by the use of quality-guaranteeing prices assumed that pro fits were dissipated through investment in brand-name capital and ent ry. The model of this paper allows both possibilities. It is shown th at both types of dissipation will, in general, occur and that brand-n ame investment will dissipate a greater share of profits as the elast icity of consumer response to brand-name investment…
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
This paper argues that regulatory institutions in defense procurement are (and necessarily must be) organized to create prizes for innovation in the form of positive economic profit on production contracts. This has a number of important policy implications. The values of the prizes on twelve major aerospace projects are estimated using stock-market data and are shown to be large. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation . Jean-Jacques Laffont , Jean Tirole
Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process
This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive …
Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives
This paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures. The main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level. The income measure created by this allocation rule is usually refe…
Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Investment Decisions
This paper considers the profit-maximization problem of a firm that must make sunk investments in long-lived assets to produce output. It is shown that if per-period accounting income is calculated using a simple and natural allocation rule for investment, called the relative replacement cost (RRC) rule, under a broad range of plausible circumstances, the firm can choose the fully optimal sequence of investments over time simply by choosing a lev…
Economics (7 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Incentive (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Procurement (3 works) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (2 works) · Capital Investment and Risk Analysis (2 works) · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works)