Elie Tamer
Biographic Data
| ID | 1455157 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elie Tamer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elie |
| FAMILY NAME | Tamer |
| SIGNATURE | TAMER E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Market Structure and Competition in Airline Markets
We provide an econometric framework for estimating a game of simultaneous entry and pricing decisions in oligopolistic markets while allowing for correlations between unobserved fixed costs, marginal costs, and demand shocks. Firms' decisions to enter a market are based on whether they will realize positive profits from entry. We use our framework to quantitatively account for this selection problem in the pricing stage. We estimate this model us…
Discussion on “ Transparency in Structural Research” by I. Andrews, M. Gentkow and J. Shapiro
We provide a complementary approach to global sensitivity analysis that should be useful for empirical work in economics
Heteroscedastic Transformation Models With Covariate Dependent Censoring
In this article we propose an inferential procedure for transformation models with conditional heteroscedasticity in the error terms. The proposed method is robust to covariate dependent censoring of arbitrary form. We provide sufficient conditions for point identification. We then propose an estimator and show that it is √n-consistent and asymptotically normal. We conduct a simulation study that reveals adequate finite sample performance. We als…
The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games
We examine the identification power that (Nash) equilibrium assumptions play in conducting inference about parameters in some simple games. We focus on three static games in which we drop the Nash equilibrium assumption and instead use rationalizability as the basis for strategic play. The first example examines a bivariate discrete game with complete information of the kind studied in entry models. The second example considers the incomplete-inf…
Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
While English auctions are the most common in practice, their rules typically lack sufficient structure to yield a tractable theoretical model without significant abstractions. Rather than relying on one stylized model to provide an exact interpretation of the data, we explore an incomplete model based on two simple assumptions: bidders neither bid more than their valuations nor let an opponent win at a price they would be willing to beat. Focusi…
Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
While English auctions are the most common in practice, their rules typically lack sufficient structure to yield a tractable theoretical model without significant abstractions. Rather than relying on one stylized model to provide an exact interpretation of the data, we explore an incomplete model based on two simple assumptions: bidders neither bid more than their valuations nor let an opponent win at a price they would be willing to beat. Focusi…
Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
While English auctions are the most common in practice, their rules typically lack sufficient structure to yield a tractable theoretical model without significant abstractions. Rather than relying on one stylized model to provide an exact interpretation of the data, we explore an incomplete model based on two simple assumptions: bidders neither bid more than their valuations nor let an opponent win at a price they would be willing to beat. Focusi…
The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games
We examine the identification power that (Nash) equilibrium assumptions play in conducting inference about parameters in some simple games. We focus on three static games in which we drop the Nash equilibrium assumption and instead use rationalizability as the basis for strategic play. The first example examines a bivariate discrete game with complete information of the kind studied in entry models. The second example considers the incomplete-inf…
Heteroscedastic Transformation Models With Covariate Dependent Censoring
In this article we propose an inferential procedure for transformation models with conditional heteroscedasticity in the error terms. The proposed method is robust to covariate dependent censoring of arbitrary form. We provide sufficient conditions for point identification. We then propose an estimator and show that it is √n-consistent and asymptotically normal. We conduct a simulation study that reveals adequate finite sample performance. We als…
Discussion on “ Transparency in Structural Research” by I. Andrews, M. Gentkow and J. Shapiro
We provide a complementary approach to global sensitivity analysis that should be useful for empirical work in economics
Market Structure and Competition in Airline Markets
We provide an econometric framework for estimating a game of simultaneous entry and pricing decisions in oligopolistic markets while allowing for correlations between unobserved fixed costs, marginal costs, and demand shocks. Firms' decisions to enter a market are based on whether they will realize positive profits from entry. We use our framework to quantitatively account for this selection problem in the pricing stage. We estimate this model us…
Econometrics (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Estimator (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Statistics (2 works) · Art History and Market Analysis (1 work)