Timothy J Layton
Biographic Data
| ID | 1471526 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Timothy J Layton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Timothy J |
| FAMILY NAME | Layton |
| SIGNATURE | LAYTON T J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Timothy J. Layton is Assistant Professor of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts. Both authors are Faculty Research Fellows, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reducing Administrative Barriers Increases Take-Up of Subsidized Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Administrative barriers to social insurance program take-up are pervasive, including in subsidized health insurance. We conducted a randomized controlled trial with Massachusetts' Affordable Care Act marketplace to reduce these barriers and other behavioral frictions. We find that a “check the box” streamlined enrollment intervention raises enrollment by 10.5%, more than personalized reminder letters (7.6% increase) or generic reminder letters (4…
The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets
Insurance markets often feature consumer sorting along both an extensive margin (whether to buy) and an intensive margin (which plan to buy). We present a new graphical theoretical framework that extends a workhorse model to incorporate both selection margins simultaneously. A key insight from our framework is that policies aimed at addressing one margin of selection often involve an economically meaningful trade-off on the other margin in terms …
Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies
Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even-and perhaps especially-when consumers are well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection. Selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be und…
Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies
Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even-and perhaps especially-when consumers are well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection. Selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be und…
Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies
Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even-and perhaps especially-when consumers are well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection. Selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be und…
The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets
Insurance markets often feature consumer sorting along both an extensive margin (whether to buy) and an intensive margin (which plan to buy). We present a new graphical theoretical framework that extends a workhorse model to incorporate both selection margins simultaneously. A key insight from our framework is that policies aimed at addressing one margin of selection often involve an economically meaningful trade-off on the other margin in terms …
Reducing Administrative Barriers Increases Take-Up of Subsidized Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Administrative barriers to social insurance program take-up are pervasive, including in subsidized health insurance. We conducted a randomized controlled trial with Massachusetts' Affordable Care Act marketplace to reduce these barriers and other behavioral frictions. We find that a “check the box” streamlined enrollment intervention raises enrollment by 10.5%, more than personalized reminder letters (7.6% increase) or generic reminder letters (4…
Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Global Health Care Issues (3 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (3 works) · Actuarial science (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Adverse selection (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works)