Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4030294 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Geruso (0000-0001-8342-9352, Michael Geruso is Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.), Timothy J Layton (Timothy J. Layton is Assistant Professor of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts. Both authors are Faculty Research Fellows, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.), Timothy Layton (0000-0001-9626-4892, National Bureau of Economic Research) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 23-50 |
| Publication date | 2017-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.31.4.23 |
| PMID | 29465215 |
| OpenAlex | W2757562332 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 32 |
Selection (adverse or advantageous) is the central problem that inhibits the smooth, efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets. Even-and perhaps especially-when consumers are well-informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice, such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection. Selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be under- or overinsured. In its simplest form, adverse selection arises due to the tendency of those who expect to incur high health care costs in the future to be the most motivated purchasers. The costlier enrollees are more likely to become insured rather than to remain uninsured, and conditional on having health insurance, the costlier enrollees sort themselves to the more generous plans in the choice set. These dual problems represent the primary concerns for policymakers designing regulations for health insurance markets. In this essay, we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates. We emphasize the two markets that seem especially likely to be targets of reform in the short and medium term: Medicare Advantage (the private plan option available under Medicare) and the state-level individual insurance markets
Actuarial science · Adverse selection · Business · Economics · General insurance · Group insurance · Income protection insurance · Insurance policy · Public economics · Global Health Care Issues · Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life · Healthcare Policy and Management
Adverse selection and health insurance decisions of young migrant workers
Subsidy Design in Privately Provided Social Insurance
Improving Affordability and Equity in Medicare Advantage
Estimated Costs of a Reinsurance Program to Stabilize the Individual Health Insurance Market
The impact of public-private partnership health plans on private insurance
Estimating Self‐Selection in Medicare Advantage
The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets
Upcoding
German Long-Term Health Insurance
Effects of State-Level Individual Mandate on Veterans’ Access to Health Care in the United States
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets
Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange
Estimated Costs of a Reinsurance Program to Stabilize the Individual Health Insurance Market
Improving Affordability and Equity in Medicare Advantage
Time-Consistent Health Insurance
Upcoding
Selection in Insurance Markets
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |