Koleman S Strumpf
Biographic Data
| ID | 1471533 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Koleman S Strumpf |
| GIVEN NAMES | Koleman S |
| FAMILY NAME | Strumpf |
| SIGNATURE | STRUMPF K S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Associate Professor of Economics, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Historical Presidential Betting Markets
This paper analyzes the large and often well-organized markets for betting on U.S. presidential elections that operated between 1868 and 1940. Four main points are addressed. First, we show that the market did a remarkable job forecasting elections in an era before scientific polling. Second, the market was fairly efficient, despite the limited information of participants and active attempts to manipulate the odds. Third, we argue political betti…
Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests
Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism
The economic theory of federalism is largely built around the premise that more heterogeneous preferences result in more decentralized policy making. Despite its prominence and importance, this central tenet of economic federalism has never been empirically evaluated. This paper presents the first formal test of the link between preference heterogeneity and endogenous policy decentralization using as a case study liquor control in the United Stat…
Infrequent Assessments Distort Property Taxes: Theory and Evidence
Historical Presidential Betting Markets
This paper analyzes the large and often well-organized markets for betting on U.S. presidential elections that operated between 1868 and 1940. Four main points are addressed. First, we show that the market did a remarkable job forecasting elections in an era before scientific polling. Second, the market was fairly efficient, despite the limited information of participants and active attempts to manipulate the odds. Third, we argue political betti…
Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism
The economic theory of federalism is largely built around the premise that more heterogeneous preferences result in more decentralized policy making. Despite its prominence and importance, this central tenet of economic federalism has never been empirically evaluated. This paper presents the first formal test of the link between preference heterogeneity and endogenous policy decentralization using as a case study liquor control in the United Stat…
Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests
Infrequent Assessments Distort Property Taxes: Theory and Evidence
Infrequent Assessments Distort Property Taxes: Theory and Evidence
Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests
Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism
The economic theory of federalism is largely built around the premise that more heterogeneous preferences result in more decentralized policy making. Despite its prominence and importance, this central tenet of economic federalism has never been empirically evaluated. This paper presents the first formal test of the link between preference heterogeneity and endogenous policy decentralization using as a case study liquor control in the United Stat…
Historical Presidential Betting Markets
This paper analyzes the large and often well-organized markets for betting on U.S. presidential elections that operated between 1868 and 1940. Four main points are addressed. First, we show that the market did a remarkable job forecasting elections in an era before scientific polling. Second, the market was fairly efficient, despite the limited information of participants and active attempts to manipulate the odds. Third, we argue political betti…
Economics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Financial economics (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Government (linguistics (2 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (2 works) · Presidential system (2 works)