Jessica N Terman
Biographic Data
| ID | 1487818 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jessica N Terman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jessica N |
| FAMILY NAME | Terman |
| SIGNATURE | TERMAN J N |
| AFFILIATIONS | George Mason University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 63 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Political Institutions and the State: Pathways to Providing Local Public Goods
Political Institutions and the State: Pathways to Providing Local Public Goods Charles R. Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Raúl A. Ponce Rodriguez. ( 2019). Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism: A Fine Balance. North Hampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 217 pp. Jessica N Terman Jessica N Terman George Mason University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Public…
Walking in the Shadow of Pressman and Wildavsky: Expanding Fiscal Federalism and Goal Congruence Theories to Single-Shot Games
We advance and test a theory of grant compliance in single-shot games by combining the insights on grant management from Pressman and Wildavsky's classic work with the role that goal congruence and local political institutions play in the intergovernmental grant process. One-time grants, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, require unique grant management techniques on the part of the federal government and local political institut…
The Effect of Formal and Informal Contracting Mechanisms on Implementation Performance in the U.S. Federalist System
The relationship between contract management capacity and implementation success in local government contracting is well established. However, less is known about how specific contract mechanisms are linked to this success. This study uses implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program to examine the use of formal and informal contract management techniques in the implementation of energy projects. The use of formal …
Improving Outcomes in Fiscal Federalism: Local Political Leadership and Administrative Capacity
This study investigates how the political influence of local elected officials and the administrative capacities of local administrative agencies together shape outcomes in fiscal federalism. The results demonstrate that differences in support and direct involvements of local officials in federally funded energy programs influence the timeliness of implementation processes. Direct mayoral involvement in the grant application process increases the…
Improving Outcomes in Fiscal Federalism: Local Political Leadership and Administrative Capacity
This study investigates how the political influence of local elected officials and the administrative capacities of local administrative agencies together shape outcomes in fiscal federalism. The results demonstrate that differences in support and direct involvements of local officials in federally funded energy programs influence the timeliness of implementation processes. Direct mayoral involvement in the grant application process increases the…
Walking in the Shadow of Pressman and Wildavsky: Expanding Fiscal Federalism and Goal Congruence Theories to Single-Shot Games
We advance and test a theory of grant compliance in single-shot games by combining the insights on grant management from Pressman and Wildavsky's classic work with the role that goal congruence and local political institutions play in the intergovernmental grant process. One-time grants, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, require unique grant management techniques on the part of the federal government and local political institut…
The Effect of Formal and Informal Contracting Mechanisms on Implementation Performance in the U.S. Federalist System
The relationship between contract management capacity and implementation success in local government contracting is well established. However, less is known about how specific contract mechanisms are linked to this success. This study uses implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program to examine the use of formal and informal contract management techniques in the implementation of energy projects. The use of formal …
The Effect of Formal and Informal Contracting Mechanisms on Implementation Performance in the U.S. Federalist System
The relationship between contract management capacity and implementation success in local government contracting is well established. However, less is known about how specific contract mechanisms are linked to this success. This study uses implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program to examine the use of formal and informal contract management techniques in the implementation of energy projects. The use of formal …
Improving Outcomes in Fiscal Federalism: Local Political Leadership and Administrative Capacity
This study investigates how the political influence of local elected officials and the administrative capacities of local administrative agencies together shape outcomes in fiscal federalism. The results demonstrate that differences in support and direct involvements of local officials in federally funded energy programs influence the timeliness of implementation processes. Direct mayoral involvement in the grant application process increases the…
Walking in the Shadow of Pressman and Wildavsky: Expanding Fiscal Federalism and Goal Congruence Theories to Single-Shot Games
We advance and test a theory of grant compliance in single-shot games by combining the insights on grant management from Pressman and Wildavsky's classic work with the role that goal congruence and local political institutions play in the intergovernmental grant process. One-time grants, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, require unique grant management techniques on the part of the federal government and local political institut…
Political Institutions and the State: Pathways to Providing Local Public Goods
Political Institutions and the State: Pathways to Providing Local Public Goods Charles R. Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Raúl A. Ponce Rodriguez. ( 2019). Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism: A Fine Balance. North Hampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 217 pp. Jessica N Terman Jessica N Terman George Mason University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Public…
Political science (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Federalism (3 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (3 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Public Administration (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Law (2 works)