Charlotte Twight
Biographic Data
| ID | 1487964 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charlotte Twight |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charlotte |
| FAMILY NAME | Twight |
| SIGNATURE | TWIGHT C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Boise State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 57 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
What congressmen knew and when they knew it: Further evidence on the origins of U.S. broadcasting regulation
Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation: An Integrating Theory
This article shows linkages between a broadened transaction-cost theory of politics and prior studies analyzing governmental behavior such as agenda control, strategic use of information, cost concealment and cost dispersion. It develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs in order to facilitate both more comprehensive specification of the determinants of such political behavior and more accurate assessmen…
Urban amenities, demand revelation, and the free-rider problem: A partial solution
Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision
From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame: The Evolution of Congressional Strategy for Asbestos Management
This paper develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blameavoidance explanations of congressional behavior and evaluates it against asbestos policy in the United States from the 1920s through the 1980s. Public policy is viewed as shaped by officeholders' ability to achieve political ends through augmenting information costs and other transaction costs facing the public. Public perceptions are seen both as the endogenous product of congre…
On the efficiency of law: A public choice perspective
Regulation of Asbestos the Microana1ytics of Government Failure
This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which-in both capacities-it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major governme…
The Political Economy of the National Defense Stockpile
It is really a cynical playing of politics with this issue of the strategic stockpile. I don't like being on watch while this kind of nonsense is going on. (Humphrey, 1983, p. 67) Few government programs display both the political salability and the vulnerability to political manipulation that characterize the National Defense Stockpile. This article analyzes the ways in which changing institutional constraints have shaped the nature and extent o…
Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government
From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame: The Evolution of Congressional Strategy for Asbestos Management
This paper develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blameavoidance explanations of congressional behavior and evaluates it against asbestos policy in the United States from the 1920s through the 1980s. Public policy is viewed as shaped by officeholders' ability to achieve political ends through augmenting information costs and other transaction costs facing the public. Public perceptions are seen both as the endogenous product of congre…
Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation: An Integrating Theory
This article shows linkages between a broadened transaction-cost theory of politics and prior studies analyzing governmental behavior such as agenda control, strategic use of information, cost concealment and cost dispersion. It develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs in order to facilitate both more comprehensive specification of the determinants of such political behavior and more accurate assessmen…
On the efficiency of law: A public choice perspective
Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government
Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision
Regulation of Asbestos the Microana1ytics of Government Failure
This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which-in both capacities-it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major governme…
What congressmen knew and when they knew it: Further evidence on the origins of U.S. broadcasting regulation
The Political Economy of the National Defense Stockpile
It is really a cynical playing of politics with this issue of the strategic stockpile. I don't like being on watch while this kind of nonsense is going on. (Humphrey, 1983, p. 67) Few government programs display both the political salability and the vulnerability to political manipulation that characterize the National Defense Stockpile. This article analyzes the ways in which changing institutional constraints have shaped the nature and extent o…
Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government
The Political Economy of the National Defense Stockpile
It is really a cynical playing of politics with this issue of the strategic stockpile. I don't like being on watch while this kind of nonsense is going on. (Humphrey, 1983, p. 67) Few government programs display both the political salability and the vulnerability to political manipulation that characterize the National Defense Stockpile. This article analyzes the ways in which changing institutional constraints have shaped the nature and extent o…
On the efficiency of law: A public choice perspective
Regulation of Asbestos the Microana1ytics of Government Failure
This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which-in both capacities-it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major governme…
From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame: The Evolution of Congressional Strategy for Asbestos Management
This paper develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blameavoidance explanations of congressional behavior and evaluates it against asbestos policy in the United States from the 1920s through the 1980s. Public policy is viewed as shaped by officeholders' ability to achieve political ends through augmenting information costs and other transaction costs facing the public. Public perceptions are seen both as the endogenous product of congre…
Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision
Urban amenities, demand revelation, and the free-rider problem: A partial solution
Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation: An Integrating Theory
This article shows linkages between a broadened transaction-cost theory of politics and prior studies analyzing governmental behavior such as agenda control, strategic use of information, cost concealment and cost dispersion. It develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs in order to facilitate both more comprehensive specification of the determinants of such political behavior and more accurate assessmen…
What congressmen knew and when they knew it: Further evidence on the origins of U.S. broadcasting regulation
Economics (9 works) · Political science (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Public economics (6 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Public finance (4 works)