Regulation of Asbestos the Microana1ytics of Government Failure
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4773239 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Charlotte Twight (Senologic Hellenic Society, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 9-39 |
| Publication date | 1990-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Policy Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1541-132X • E-ISSN: 1541-1338 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1990.tb00064.x |
| OpenAlex | W2061913002 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 34 |
This article analyzes the government's role in regulating asbestos-related health hazards in the United States. The U.S. government has served as both promoter and regulator of the U.S. asbestos industry, and this article examines the extent to which-in both capacities-it has hindered rather than facilitated the information dissemination essential to voluntary assumption of asbestos related risks. In documenting the behavior of the major government actors, this paper investigates the political and economic forces that have shaped U.S. asbestos policy. It shows how the Congressional transition from promoter to regulator of the asbestos industry can be explained by the susceptibility of political processes to transaction-cost augmentation by the bureaucracy
Asbestos · Bureaucracy · Business · Economics · Government failure · Government regulation · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public finance · Regulator · Transaction cost · Law · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Finance
Congress, keystone of the Washington establishment
Bureaucrats and Politicians
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
The Logic of Collective Action
Regulating Consumer Product Safety
Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs
Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government
On the efficiency of law
Congress, The Electoral Connection
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
Information Transmission in Debate
The Political Economy of the National Defense Stockpile
Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority
Asymmetric Information and The Coherence of Legislation
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2001 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |