Barbara Baum Levenbook
Biographic Data
| ID | 1490175 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Barbara Baum Levenbook |
| GIVEN NAMES | Barbara Baum |
| FAMILY NAME | Levenbook |
| SIGNATURE | LEVENBOOK B B |
| AFFILIATIONS | North Carolina State University |
| ORCID | 0009-0001-3997-7471 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Beyond Legislative Intent
There is a widely held view that legislative intention determines the meaning of a statute. The focus of this article is meaning in the sense of full linguistic content, which may not be the same as legal content. Linguistic intentionalism appears to have its greatest appeal when a statute has a partly implied linguistic meaning. It seems natural to suppose that the part of the meaning that is implied by the explicit wording in the statute is det…
Dworkin's Theoretical Disagreement Argument
Dworkin's theoretical disagreement argument, developed in Law's Empire, is presented in that work as the motivator for his interpretive account of law. Like Dworkin's earlier arguments critical of legal positivism, the argument from theoretical disagreement has generated a lively exchange with legal positivists. It has motivated three of them to develop innovative positivist positions.In its original guise, the argument from theoretical disagreem…
On preferential admission
No prominent works on this page.
On preferential admission
Dworkin's Theoretical Disagreement Argument
Dworkin's theoretical disagreement argument, developed in Law's Empire, is presented in that work as the motivator for his interpretive account of law. Like Dworkin's earlier arguments critical of legal positivism, the argument from theoretical disagreement has generated a lively exchange with legal positivists. It has motivated three of them to develop innovative positivist positions.In its original guise, the argument from theoretical disagreem…
Beyond Legislative Intent
There is a widely held view that legislative intention determines the meaning of a statute. The focus of this article is meaning in the sense of full linguistic content, which may not be the same as legal content. Linguistic intentionalism appears to have its greatest appeal when a statute has a partly implied linguistic meaning. It seems natural to suppose that the part of the meaning that is implied by the explicit wording in the statute is det…
Business (2 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Comparative law (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Epistemology (1 works) · History and advancements in chemistry (1 works) · Law in Society and Culture (1 works) · Legal case studies and regulations (1 works)