Dworkin's Theoretical Disagreement Argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079335 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barbara Baum Levenbook (0009-0001-3997-7471, North Carolina State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-9 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12186 |
| OpenAlex | W1517718434 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 9 |
Dworkin's theoretical disagreement argument, developed in Law's Empire, is presented in that work as the motivator for his interpretive account of law. Like Dworkin's earlier arguments critical of legal positivism, the argument from theoretical disagreement has generated a lively exchange with legal positivists. It has motivated three of them to develop innovative positivist positions.In its original guise, the argument from theoretical disagreement is presented as 'the semantic sting argument'. However, the argument from theoretical disagreement has more than one version. This article briefly discusses two versions and the leading replies to them, then focuses on the most influential (recast) version, directed at Hartian positivism. The article surveys the leading positivist rejoinders to the recast version, indicating key Dworkinian replies or assessing the strength of these rejoinders, and concludes with a rejoinder of its own, making a new case that the argument from theoretical disagreement isn't fatal for Hartian legal positivism
Comparative law · Epistemology · Legal positivism · Philosophy of law · Political science · Positivism · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Legal principles and applications · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2023 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |