Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8085706 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dennis Patterson (0000-0002-5770-6376, Rutgers University Camden Campus, E424, 217 N 5th St Camden NJ 08102 USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 260-275 |
| Publication date | 2018-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio Juris (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1794-6638 • E-ISSN: 2619-4066 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/raju.12216 |
| OpenAlex | W2795766232 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 14 |
Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article
Black letter law · Comparative law · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Legal formalism · Legal positivism · Legal realism · Legal research · Political science · Positivism · Private law · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy
What is Positivism Today
Dennis Patterson on Wittgenstein
Dworkin, a Leitura Moral Da Constituição E Os Problemas Da Legimidade Democrática E Da Segurança Jurídica
How to Answer Dworkin’s Argument from Theoretical Disagreement Without Attributing Confusion or Disingenuity to Legal Officials
Legality’s Law’s Empire
Bending the Arc of Law
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |