Kristin Primus
Biographic Data
| ID | 1490360 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kristin Primus |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kristin |
| FAMILY NAME | Primus |
| SIGNATURE | PRIMUS K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4184-6371 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Spinoza’s Monism I
In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is non-infinite (i. e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i. e., enduring). I also argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causation, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-…
Spinoza’s Monism II
An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E 1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal ( E 1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,” “Spinoza’s Monism I,” in the previous issue of this journal. I pointed out…
Part V of Spinoza's Ethics
In this article, I sketch a way of understanding three important doctrines from Spinoza's Ethics: intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva), contentment of mind (acquiescentia mentis), and intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis). Along the way, I suggest how these doctrines could build on more familiar doctrines, including monism, necessitarianism, the parallelism of ideas and bodies, and the "ideas of ideas
No prominent works on this page.
Part V of Spinoza's Ethics
In this article, I sketch a way of understanding three important doctrines from Spinoza's Ethics: intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva), contentment of mind (acquiescentia mentis), and intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis). Along the way, I suggest how these doctrines could build on more familiar doctrines, including monism, necessitarianism, the parallelism of ideas and bodies, and the "ideas of ideas
Spinoza’s Monism I
In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is non-infinite (i. e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i. e., enduring). I also argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causation, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-…
Spinoza’s Monism II
An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E 1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal ( E 1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,” “Spinoza’s Monism I,” in the previous issue of this journal. I pointed out…
Epistemology (3 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (3 works) · Monism (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought (3 works) · Causation (2 works) · Denial (2 works) · Interpretation (philosophy) (2 works) · Political Theology and Sovereignty (2 works)