Marco Runkel
Biographic Data
| ID | 1582326 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marco Runkel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marco |
| FAMILY NAME | Runkel |
| SIGNATURE | RUNKEL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Technische Universität Berlin |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9306-1974 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Animal welfare, moral consumers and the optimal regulation of animal food production
Even small trade costs restore efficiency in tax competition
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The…
Tax evasion and competition
Using a C ournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competiti…
Hyperbolic Discounting, Public Debt and Balanced Budget Rules
This paper considers a government that chooses its tax and borrowing policy in order to minimize the present value of the excess burden caused by taxation. In doing so, the government uses hyperbolic discounting. It turns out that public deficits are positive even if public expenditures are constant over time. With cyclical expenditures, the government chooses an asymmetric debt policy, i.e., in bad times it borrows more than it repays in good ti…
Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The…
Tax evasion and competition
Using a C ournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competiti…
Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function
Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function
Hyperbolic Discounting, Public Debt and Balanced Budget Rules
This paper considers a government that chooses its tax and borrowing policy in order to minimize the present value of the excess burden caused by taxation. In doing so, the government uses hyperbolic discounting. It turns out that public deficits are positive even if public expenditures are constant over time. With cyclical expenditures, the government chooses an asymmetric debt policy, i.e., in bad times it borrows more than it repays in good ti…
Tax evasion and competition
Using a C ournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competiti…
Even small trade costs restore efficiency in tax competition
The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The…
Animal welfare, moral consumers and the optimal regulation of animal food production
Economics (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Public economics (4 works) · Welfare (4 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Monetary economics (3 works) · Ad valorem tax (2 works) · Competition (biology (2 works) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (2 works)