Eduardo Alemán
Biographic Data
| ID | 158573 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eduardo Alemán |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eduardo |
| FAMILY NAME | Alemán |
| SIGNATURE | ALEMÁN E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Houston |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0389-9106 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 33 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 533 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 33 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 14 |
Penalizing women MPs: The approval of women-initiated bills in the Turkish parliament
This article examines the effect of female bill authorship on bill approval. The analysis focuses on the Turkish Parliament between 2002 and 2015. During this time, the Islamic Justice and Development Party controlled the country’s government and a parliamentary majority, and gender issues became central to political discourse. Using a novel data set of content-coded private members’ bills, we evaluate whether gender affected bill approval. The a…
Gender, Institutions, and Legislative Speech
Speechmaking is a vital resource for legislators and holds particular importance for women lawmakers, who frequently constitute a numerical minority and face constraints on their political influence. We argue that formal and informal institutions, district characteristics, and issue priorities shape women's speech participation. Analyzing twenty-eight years of speeches from Chile's Chamber of Deputies, we first show that women's speeches constitu…
Gambling on the constitution: Abortion rights and the 2023 constitution-making process in Chile
When submitted to popular ratification, new constitutions tend to be approved. Chilean voters, however, rejected the proposal put forward by the country’s Constitutional Council in 2023. This article examines the reasons for this outcome. Leveraging an original conjoint experiment exploring voter preferences across four policy areas, we demonstrate that most voters disfavored a proposed clause protecting unborn life, which would have likely restr…
Speech targeting and constituency representation in open-list electoral systems
Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech
This article examines the effects of committee specialization and district characteristics on speech participation by topic and congressional forum. It argues that committee specialization should increase speech participation during legislative debates, while district characteristics should affect the likelihood of speech participation in non-lawmaking forums. To examine these expectations, we analyze over 100,000 speeches delivered in the Chilea…
Chile’s Failed Constitution: Democracy Wins
On 4 September 2002, Chileans unequivocally rebuffed a new constitution proposed by an elected convention tasked with replacing the constitution inherited from the military government. The constitution-writing process started with broad support among the population, and in its early days most believed approval would be certain. However, over time, trust in the convention plummeted, and opposition to the content of its proposal soared. This articl…
Centralidad y productividad legislativa en la Cámara de Diputados Argentina, 1983-2019
¿Qué factores afectan la productividad de los legisladores? En este artículo, argumentamos que la productividad legislativa depende no solo de la afiliaciÃ3n partidaria, la experiencia, el género y otras consideraciones contextuales (por ejemplo, la alineaciÃ3n con el ejecutivo), como han demostrado estudios anteriores, sino también de las conexiones entre los legisladores. Nuestro principal argumento es que la productividad de los diputados depe…
Bicameral Lawmaking: Analysing the Choices of Revising Chambers
This article examines the choices made by revising chambers in bicameral congresses. It analyses how bill characteristics, chamber congruence, impatience and institutional context influence the decisions made by revising chambers regarding executive bills sent by the chamber of origin. The analysis focuses on the case of Chile, a presidential country in which the executive has substantial proposal power. The findings show that the probability of …
Parliamentary rules, party norms, and legislative speech
This article examines speech participation under different parliamentary rules: open forums dedicated to bill debates, and closed forums reserved for non-lawmaking speeches. It discusses how electoral incentives influence speechmaking by promoting divergent party norms within those forums. Our empirical analysis focuses on the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The findings lend support to the view that, in forums dedicated to non-lawmaking speeches, p…
Coalition incentives and party bias in Chile
Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation
According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters' positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate "shirking" by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters' relati…
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina
We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine…
The hidden electoral connection: Analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators' information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised …
Party Strategies, Constituency Links, and Legislative Speech
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote‐seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking…
The nationalization of presidential elections in the Americas
The democratizing effect of education
Several influential scholars have argued that increases in education improve levels of democracy. However, relevant challenges to this view have also figured prominently. In this article we tackle this controversy. We examine the link between education and democracy using an expanded dataset on educational attainment that covers most of the postwar era. We find that increases in levels of education improve levels of democracy and that the democra…
Coauthorship Ties in the Colombian Congress, 2002-2006
This paper examines policy connections between Colombian legislators (representatives and senators) during Álvaro Uribe’s first presidential term (2002-2006). The analysis draws on information regarding the coauthorship of legislation. The joint sponsorship of a bill by a pair of legislators demonstrates their mutual intent to change the status quo in a specific direction. This cooperative effort to push bills forward reveals the similarities tha…
Political realignment and democratic breakdown in Argentina, 1916–1930
This article revisits one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed in the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate why the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Instead, we contend that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitima…
Latin American Legislative Politics: A Survey of Peer-Reviewed Publications in English
This study discusses basic trends in articles on legislative politics in Latin America published in twelve journals between 2000 and 2010. It examines the distribution of the articles over time and by journal, the authors’ institutional affiliations and patterns of collaboration, the frequency with which various countries are studied, and common approaches and topics. The articles in this set are all peer-reviewed and published in English
Explaining Policy Ties in Presidential Congresses: A Network Analysis of Bill Initiation Data
Policy networks formed by co-authoring and co-sponsoring bills reflect one of the most important types of connection legislators develop while in office. We expect that in presidential countries, the probability of a tie between two legislators should be influenced by partisan membership, territorial linkages and the policy areas in which they develop expertise. Given the complex nature of relational data and the particular characteristics of bil…
Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas
This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation in presidential systems. It shows that party positions and institutions influence the formation of government coalitions. We argue that presidents will tend to include parties positioned close to their policy positions in their cabinets, and will be more inclined to do it when relative institutional authority is more advantageous to congress. We corroborate our arguments with data from 13 p…
Legislative Parties in Volatile, Nonprogrammatic Party Systems: The Peruvian Case in Comparative Perspective
This article extends the analysis of political parties in electorally volatile and organizationally weak party systems by evaluating two implications centered on legislative voting behavior. First, it examines whether disunity prevails where weakness of programmatic and electoral commonalities abound. Second, it analyzes whether inchoate party systems weaken the ability of government parties to control the congressional agenda. The empirical anal…
Unified Government, Bill Approval, and the Legislative Weight of the President
This article proposes a new approach to measuring the legislative weight of the president and Congress based on the approval of each actor’s legislative agenda. The authors focus on presidential systems where presidents possess both formal authority to introduce their own bills and a variety of prerogatives to influence the passage of legislation. The authors argue that the legislative weight of the president varies over time in response to conte…
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
We use bill cosponsorship and roll‐call vote data to compare legislators' revealed preferences in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. We estimate ideal points from bill cosponsorship data using principal‐component analysis on an agreement matrix that included information on all bills introduced in the U.S. House (1973–2000) and Argentine Chamber (1983–2002). The ideal‐point estimates of legislators' revealed p…
Institutions and the Legislative Success of ‘Strong’ Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile
This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy, as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced …
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
We use bill cosponsorship and roll‐call vote data to compare legislators' revealed preferences in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. We estimate ideal points from bill cosponsorship data using principal‐component analysis on an agreement matrix that included information on all bills introduced in the U.S. House (1973–2000) and Argentine Chamber (1983–2002). The ideal‐point estimates of legislators' revealed p…
Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas
This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation in presidential systems. It shows that party positions and institutions influence the formation of government coalitions. We argue that presidents will tend to include parties positioned close to their policy positions in their cabinets, and will be more inclined to do it when relative institutional authority is more advantageous to congress. We corroborate our arguments with data from 13 p…
Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America
Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These “amendatory observations” return to Congress for afinalround of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries …
Institutions and the Legislative Success of ‘Strong’ Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile
This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy, as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced …
Unified Government, Bill Approval, and the Legislative Weight of the President
This article proposes a new approach to measuring the legislative weight of the president and Congress based on the approval of each actor’s legislative agenda. The authors focus on presidential systems where presidents possess both formal authority to introduce their own bills and a variety of prerogatives to influence the passage of legislation. The authors argue that the legislative weight of the president varies over time in response to conte…
Explaining Policy Ties in Presidential Congresses: A Network Analysis of Bill Initiation Data
Policy networks formed by co-authoring and co-sponsoring bills reflect one of the most important types of connection legislators develop while in office. We expect that in presidential countries, the probability of a tie between two legislators should be influenced by partisan membership, territorial linkages and the policy areas in which they develop expertise. Given the complex nature of relational data and the particular characteristics of bil…
The nationalization of electoral change in the Americas
Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures
Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policym…
Party Strategies, Constituency Links, and Legislative Speech
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote‐seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking…
Chile’s Failed Constitution: Democracy Wins
On 4 September 2002, Chileans unequivocally rebuffed a new constitution proposed by an elected convention tasked with replacing the constitution inherited from the military government. The constitution-writing process started with broad support among the population, and in its early days most believed approval would be certain. However, over time, trust in the convention plummeted, and opposition to the content of its proposal soared. This articl…
Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions
A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regi…
The hidden electoral connection: Analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators' information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised …
Institutions, Political Conflict and the Cohesion of Policy Networks in the Chilean Congress, 1961-2006
This paper focuses on congressional politics in Chile before and after the 1973 coup. It challenges a common perspective that sees the congressional decay of the early 1970s as being caused by stringent limits on particularistic bills and by presidents with wide-ranging formal prerogatives. It presents an alternative argument that focuses on electoral competition and ideological radicalisation, derives testable implications, and provides the firs…
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina
We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine…
Parliamentary rules, party norms, and legislative speech
This article examines speech participation under different parliamentary rules: open forums dedicated to bill debates, and closed forums reserved for non-lawmaking speeches. It discusses how electoral incentives influence speechmaking by promoting divergent party norms within those forums. Our empirical analysis focuses on the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The findings lend support to the view that, in forums dedicated to non-lawmaking speeches, p…
Policy positions in the chilean senate: An Analysis of Coauthorship and Roll Call Data
This paper examines the policy positions of Chilean senators. The empirical analysis focuses on two different legislative activities: voting and coauthoring bills. The roll call analysis evaluates the degree to which coalitions act as cohesive policy teams on the floor of Congress, whether parties’ positions match conventional ideological rankings, and the dimensionality of voting decisions. The coauthorship analysis provides alternative ideal po…
The democratizing effect of education
Several influential scholars have argued that increases in education improve levels of democracy. However, relevant challenges to this view have also figured prominently. In this article we tackle this controversy. We examine the link between education and democracy using an expanded dataset on educational attainment that covers most of the postwar era. We find that increases in levels of education improve levels of democracy and that the democra…
Political realignment and democratic breakdown in Argentina, 1916–1930
This article revisits one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed in the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate why the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Instead, we contend that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitima…
Latin American Legislative Politics: A Survey of Peer-Reviewed Publications in English
This study discusses basic trends in articles on legislative politics in Latin America published in twelve journals between 2000 and 2010. It examines the distribution of the articles over time and by journal, the authors’ institutional affiliations and patterns of collaboration, the frequency with which various countries are studied, and common approaches and topics. The articles in this set are all peer-reviewed and published in English
Congressional Committees, Electoral Connections, and Legislative Speech
This article examines the effects of committee specialization and district characteristics on speech participation by topic and congressional forum. It argues that committee specialization should increase speech participation during legislative debates, while district characteristics should affect the likelihood of speech participation in non-lawmaking forums. To examine these expectations, we analyze over 100,000 speeches delivered in the Chilea…
Coalition incentives and party bias in Chile
Gender, Institutions, and Legislative Speech
Speechmaking is a vital resource for legislators and holds particular importance for women lawmakers, who frequently constitute a numerical minority and face constraints on their political influence. We argue that formal and informal institutions, district characteristics, and issue priorities shape women's speech participation. Analyzing twenty-eight years of speeches from Chile's Chamber of Deputies, we first show that women's speeches constitu…
Bicameral Lawmaking: Analysing the Choices of Revising Chambers
This article examines the choices made by revising chambers in bicameral congresses. It analyses how bill characteristics, chamber congruence, impatience and institutional context influence the decisions made by revising chambers regarding executive bills sent by the chamber of origin. The analysis focuses on the case of Chile, a presidential country in which the executive has substantial proposal power. The findings show that the probability of …
The nationalization of presidential elections in the Americas
Legislative Parties in Volatile, Nonprogrammatic Party Systems: The Peruvian Case in Comparative Perspective
This article extends the analysis of political parties in electorally volatile and organizationally weak party systems by evaluating two implications centered on legislative voting behavior. First, it examines whether disunity prevails where weakness of programmatic and electoral commonalities abound. Second, it analyzes whether inchoate party systems weaken the ability of government parties to control the congressional agenda. The empirical anal…
The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America
This paper examines the origins of amendatory vetoes in Latin America and shows why presidents' ability to present a redrafted bill after congressional passage gives them considerable power to affect legislation. The paper begins with a historical account that illustrates the workings of amendatory observations in nineteenth-century Latin America—the passage of the Electoral Law of 1874in Chile. Next, it specifies the degree to which different co…
Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America
Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These “amendatory observations” return to Congress for afinalround of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries …
Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change
Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change. By Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 280p. $27.95. In this book, Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin examine the impact of international influences on policy change in Latin American countries. As the authors correctly point out, “the scholarship on political change in Latin America provides little direction for t…
Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions
A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regi…
Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures
Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policym…
Policy positions in the chilean senate: An Analysis of Coauthorship and Roll Call Data
This paper examines the policy positions of Chilean senators. The empirical analysis focuses on two different legislative activities: voting and coauthoring bills. The roll call analysis evaluates the degree to which coalitions act as cohesive policy teams on the floor of Congress, whether parties’ positions match conventional ideological rankings, and the dimensionality of voting decisions. The coauthorship analysis provides alternative ideal po…
The nationalization of electoral change in the Americas
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
We use bill cosponsorship and roll‐call vote data to compare legislators' revealed preferences in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. We estimate ideal points from bill cosponsorship data using principal‐component analysis on an agreement matrix that included information on all bills introduced in the U.S. House (1973–2000) and Argentine Chamber (1983–2002). The ideal‐point estimates of legislators' revealed p…
Institutions and the Legislative Success of ‘Strong’ Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile
This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy, as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced …
Institutions, Political Conflict and the Cohesion of Policy Networks in the Chilean Congress, 1961-2006
This paper focuses on congressional politics in Chile before and after the 1973 coup. It challenges a common perspective that sees the congressional decay of the early 1970s as being caused by stringent limits on particularistic bills and by presidents with wide-ranging formal prerogatives. It presents an alternative argument that focuses on electoral competition and ideological radicalisation, derives testable implications, and provides the firs…
Unified Government, Bill Approval, and the Legislative Weight of the President
This article proposes a new approach to measuring the legislative weight of the president and Congress based on the approval of each actor’s legislative agenda. The authors focus on presidential systems where presidents possess both formal authority to introduce their own bills and a variety of prerogatives to influence the passage of legislation. The authors argue that the legislative weight of the president varies over time in response to conte…
Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas
This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation in presidential systems. It shows that party positions and institutions influence the formation of government coalitions. We argue that presidents will tend to include parties positioned close to their policy positions in their cabinets, and will be more inclined to do it when relative institutional authority is more advantageous to congress. We corroborate our arguments with data from 13 p…
Legislative Parties in Volatile, Nonprogrammatic Party Systems: The Peruvian Case in Comparative Perspective
This article extends the analysis of political parties in electorally volatile and organizationally weak party systems by evaluating two implications centered on legislative voting behavior. First, it examines whether disunity prevails where weakness of programmatic and electoral commonalities abound. Second, it analyzes whether inchoate party systems weaken the ability of government parties to control the congressional agenda. The empirical anal…
Latin American Legislative Politics: A Survey of Peer-Reviewed Publications in English
This study discusses basic trends in articles on legislative politics in Latin America published in twelve journals between 2000 and 2010. It examines the distribution of the articles over time and by journal, the authors’ institutional affiliations and patterns of collaboration, the frequency with which various countries are studied, and common approaches and topics. The articles in this set are all peer-reviewed and published in English
Explaining Policy Ties in Presidential Congresses: A Network Analysis of Bill Initiation Data
Policy networks formed by co-authoring and co-sponsoring bills reflect one of the most important types of connection legislators develop while in office. We expect that in presidential countries, the probability of a tie between two legislators should be influenced by partisan membership, territorial linkages and the policy areas in which they develop expertise. Given the complex nature of relational data and the particular characteristics of bil…
Political realignment and democratic breakdown in Argentina, 1916–1930
This article revisits one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed in the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate why the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Instead, we contend that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitima…
The democratizing effect of education
Several influential scholars have argued that increases in education improve levels of democracy. However, relevant challenges to this view have also figured prominently. In this article we tackle this controversy. We examine the link between education and democracy using an expanded dataset on educational attainment that covers most of the postwar era. We find that increases in levels of education improve levels of democracy and that the democra…
Coauthorship Ties in the Colombian Congress, 2002-2006
This paper examines policy connections between Colombian legislators (representatives and senators) during Álvaro Uribe’s first presidential term (2002-2006). The analysis draws on information regarding the coauthorship of legislation. The joint sponsorship of a bill by a pair of legislators demonstrates their mutual intent to change the status quo in a specific direction. This cooperative effort to push bills forward reveals the similarities tha…
Party Strategies, Constituency Links, and Legislative Speech
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote‐seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking…
The nationalization of presidential elections in the Americas
Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina
We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine…
The hidden electoral connection: Analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress
Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators' information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised …
Coalition incentives and party bias in Chile
Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation
According to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters' positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate "shirking" by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters' relati…
Centralidad y productividad legislativa en la Cámara de Diputados Argentina, 1983-2019
¿Qué factores afectan la productividad de los legisladores? En este artículo, argumentamos que la productividad legislativa depende no solo de la afiliaciÃ3n partidaria, la experiencia, el género y otras consideraciones contextuales (por ejemplo, la alineaciÃ3n con el ejecutivo), como han demostrado estudios anteriores, sino también de las conexiones entre los legisladores. Nuestro principal argumento es que la productividad de los diputados depe…
Political science (32 works) · Law (31 works) · Law (27 works) · Politics (27 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (24 works) · Public Administration (20 works) · Legislature (19 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (19 works) · Economics (17 works) · Political economy (17 works)