Matthew Vermaire
Biographic Data
| ID | 1629222 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Vermaire |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Vermaire |
| SIGNATURE | VERMAIRE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0577-9741 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A Scale for Mixed Reasons for Belief
Epistemic reasons matter for what you should believe. But then, some think there are practical reasons that matter, too. How could both sorts of reasons be weighed together to determine the doxastic states you ought to hold, all things considered? I argue for general constraints on any way of understanding such combinations and offer a well‐motivated decision‐theoretic model that, unlike its competitors, meets them. When epistemic reasons are con…
Judgment's aimless heart
It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic lives. We can indeed make sense of many of …
Nudging for judging that p
Recent work in social epistemology has begun to make use of the behavioral-scientific concept of the nudge, but without sustained attention to how it should be translated from behavioral to epistemic contexts. We offer an account of doxastic nudges that satisfies extensional and theoretical desiderata, defend it against other accounts in the literature, and use it to clarify ongoing discussions of how nudges relate to reason-giving, knowledge, an…
In search of doxastic involuntarism
Against Schmought
Matti Eklund has argued that a new problem in metanormative theory arises when we consider the possibility of "normative counterparts"—normative concepts with the same normative roles as OUGHT and RIGHT (for instance), but with different extensions. I distinguish two versions of the problem, and propose a solution: when we attend to the attitudinal commitments involved in the possession and application of some normative concepts, we find that tol…
No prominent works on this page.
Against Schmought
Matti Eklund has argued that a new problem in metanormative theory arises when we consider the possibility of "normative counterparts"—normative concepts with the same normative roles as OUGHT and RIGHT (for instance), but with different extensions. I distinguish two versions of the problem, and propose a solution: when we attend to the attitudinal commitments involved in the possession and application of some normative concepts, we find that tol…
In search of doxastic involuntarism
Judgment's aimless heart
It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic lives. We can indeed make sense of many of …
Nudging for judging that p
Recent work in social epistemology has begun to make use of the behavioral-scientific concept of the nudge, but without sustained attention to how it should be translated from behavioral to epistemic contexts. We offer an account of doxastic nudges that satisfies extensional and theoretical desiderata, defend it against other accounts in the literature, and use it to clarify ongoing discussions of how nudges relate to reason-giving, knowledge, an…
A Scale for Mixed Reasons for Belief
Epistemic reasons matter for what you should believe. But then, some think there are practical reasons that matter, too. How could both sorts of reasons be weighed together to determine the doxastic states you ought to hold, all things considered? I argue for general constraints on any way of understanding such combinations and offer a well‐motivated decision‐theoretic model that, unlike its competitors, meets them. When epistemic reasons are con…
Doxastic logic (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Normative (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Categorization (1 work) · Coherentism (1 work) · Counterfactual conditional (1 work)