Judgment's aimless heart
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21364261 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Vermaire (0000-0002-0577-9741, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 3-21 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Noûs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/nous.12497 |
| OpenAlex | W4394852993 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 49 |
It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic lives. We can indeed make sense of many of our inquisitive and deliberative activities as undertaken in pursuit of such goods; but the evidence‐guided inferences in which those activities culminate will require a different theoretical approach
Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Feature (linguistics) · Inference · Normative · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Judgment and Agency
Epistemic Explanations
What is inference?
Rationality Through Reasoning
What the Tortoise Said to Achilles
The Activity of Reasoning
Reasoning first
Ends to Means
Belief and aims
Chancy Accuracy and Imprecise Credence
A limitation on agency in judgment
Epistemic normativity
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
The Epistemic and the Zetetic
How Truth Governs Belief
Doxastic Deliberation
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality
The Wrong Kind of Reason
No Norm Needed
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |