Stefan Wintein
Biographic Data
| ID | 1634168 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stefan Wintein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stefan |
| FAMILY NAME | Wintein |
| SIGNATURE | WINTEIN S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Erasmus University Rotterdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1394-9704 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A theory of fairness from consistency
Firstly, I articulate a fairness conception (FC) which combines the basic thesis of Broome’s well-known 1990 account of fairness with a requirement of non-comparative fairness and the Aristotelian thought that like cases should be treated alike . Secondly, I argue that FC implies than any fair allocation rule should respect five axioms which, conjointly, are shown to characterize the absolute priority rule $$P^\dag $$ P † . In this characterizati…
Claim-strength problems and mixtures
How to be absolutely fair Part II
In the article ‘How to be absolutely fair, Part I: the Fairness formula’, we presented the first theory of comparative and absolute fairness. Here, we relate the implications of our Fairness formula to economic theories of fair division. Our analysis makes contributions to both philosophy and economics: to the philosophical literature, we add an axiomatic discussion of proportionality and fairness. To the economic literature, we add an appealing …
How to be absolutely fair Part I
We present the first comprehensive theory of fairness that conceives of fairness as having two dimensions: a comparative and an absolute one. The comparative dimension of fairness has traditionally been the main interest of Broomean fairness theories. It has been analysed as satisfying competing individual claims in proportion to their respective strengths. And yet, many key contributors to Broomean fairness agree that ‘absolute’ fairness is impo…
To be fair
The Modal-Epistemic Argument Self-undermined
In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten defends his Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA) for the existence of God against various objections that I raised against it. In this article, I observe that Rutten’s defence fails for various reasons. Most notably though, the defence is self-undermining: the very claims that Rutten argues for in his defence yield novel counterexamples to the first premise of the MEA
Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation
Theories of Fairness and Aggregation
We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the perspective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and Saunders (Utilitas 27:460–469, 2015) proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic, or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly those that are based on cooperative…
How to be fairer
We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417–57, 2014) is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s (in Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) notion of claim…
Dividing the indivisible
Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do witho…
No prominent works on this page.
How to be fairer
We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417–57, 2014) is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s (in Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) notion of claim…
Dividing the indivisible
Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do witho…
Theories of Fairness and Aggregation
We investigate the issue of aggregativity in fair division problems from the perspective of cooperative game theory and Broomean theories of fairness. Paseau and Saunders (Utilitas 27:460–469, 2015) proved that no non-trivial theory of fairness can be aggregative and conclude that theories of fairness are therefore problematic, or at least incomplete. We observe that there are theories of fairness, particularly those that are based on cooperative…
Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation
The Modal-Epistemic Argument Self-undermined
In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten defends his Modal-Epistemic Argument (MEA) for the existence of God against various objections that I raised against it. In this article, I observe that Rutten’s defence fails for various reasons. Most notably though, the defence is self-undermining: the very claims that Rutten argues for in his defence yield novel counterexamples to the first premise of the MEA
How to be absolutely fair Part II
In the article ‘How to be absolutely fair, Part I: the Fairness formula’, we presented the first theory of comparative and absolute fairness. Here, we relate the implications of our Fairness formula to economic theories of fair division. Our analysis makes contributions to both philosophy and economics: to the philosophical literature, we add an axiomatic discussion of proportionality and fairness. To the economic literature, we add an appealing …
How to be absolutely fair Part I
We present the first comprehensive theory of fairness that conceives of fairness as having two dimensions: a comparative and an absolute one. The comparative dimension of fairness has traditionally been the main interest of Broomean fairness theories. It has been analysed as satisfying competing individual claims in proportion to their respective strengths. And yet, many key contributors to Broomean fairness agree that ‘absolute’ fairness is impo…
To be fair
A theory of fairness from consistency
Firstly, I articulate a fairness conception (FC) which combines the basic thesis of Broome’s well-known 1990 account of fairness with a requirement of non-comparative fairness and the Aristotelian thought that like cases should be treated alike . Secondly, I argue that FC implies than any fair allocation rule should respect five axioms which, conjointly, are shown to characterize the absolute priority rule $$P^\dag $$ P † . In this characterizati…
Claim-strength problems and mixtures
Economics (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (7 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Law (4 works)