Deborah Frisch
Biographic Data
| ID | 1663333 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Deborah Frisch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Deborah |
| FAMILY NAME | Frisch |
| SIGNATURE | FRISCH D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oregon |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 37 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Choices and opportunities: Another effect of framing on decisions
Many decisions can be framed either as ‘choices’ between alternative courses of action (e.g. Should I move to New York or stay in Chicago?) or as ‘opportunities’ to pursue a particular course of action (i.e. Should I move to New York?). Although there is no logical difference between these two different decision frames, there may be important psychological differences between them. In four studies, we explore the differences between ‘choices’ and…
Beyond expected utility: Rethinking behavioral decision research
Much research in psychology has evaluated the quality of people's decisions by comparisons with subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. This article suggests that typical arguments made for the status of utility theory as normative do not justify its use by psychologists as a standard by which to evaluate decision quality. It is argued that to evaluate decision quality, researchers need to identify those decision processes that tend to lead to …
Reasons for Framing Effects
Assessing the Accuracy of Decisions
Much research demonstrates that people's choices do not conform to utility theory, a model of rational decision-making (Baron, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988). Researchers have begun to question the normative status of utility theory in light of the many empirical violations of the theory. We argue that consistency with a formal model is not an appropriate standard for evaluating the quality of decisions. …
Ambiguity and rationality
Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a predic…
Violations of Probability Theory: What Do They Mean
Ambiguity and rationality
Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a predic…
Beyond expected utility: Rethinking behavioral decision research
Much research in psychology has evaluated the quality of people's decisions by comparisons with subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. This article suggests that typical arguments made for the status of utility theory as normative do not justify its use by psychologists as a standard by which to evaluate decision quality. It is argued that to evaluate decision quality, researchers need to identify those decision processes that tend to lead to …
Violations of Probability Theory: What Do They Mean
Ambiguity and rationality
Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a predic…
Violations of Probability Theory: What Do They Mean
Reasons for Framing Effects
Assessing the Accuracy of Decisions
Much research demonstrates that people's choices do not conform to utility theory, a model of rational decision-making (Baron, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988). Researchers have begun to question the normative status of utility theory in light of the many empirical violations of the theory. We argue that consistency with a formal model is not an appropriate standard for evaluating the quality of decisions. …
Beyond expected utility: Rethinking behavioral decision research
Much research in psychology has evaluated the quality of people's decisions by comparisons with subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. This article suggests that typical arguments made for the status of utility theory as normative do not justify its use by psychologists as a standard by which to evaluate decision quality. It is argued that to evaluate decision quality, researchers need to identify those decision processes that tend to lead to …
Choices and opportunities: Another effect of framing on decisions
Many decisions can be framed either as ‘choices’ between alternative courses of action (e.g. Should I move to New York or stay in Chicago?) or as ‘opportunities’ to pursue a particular course of action (i.e. Should I move to New York?). Although there is no logical difference between these two different decision frames, there may be important psychological differences between them. In four studies, we explore the differences between ‘choices’ and…
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Normative (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Decision theory (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Expected utility hypothesis (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works)